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The press and the President—any President— in
their natural state are friendly enemies. They
both believe in each other i but they both, at
some points along the way, disapprove of the
way the other one does his job.
. . . The news
equation between reporters and the President
can never be balanced. Reporters want to know
everything. And Presidents want to tell them
less than they should— or could, i,
Scheduled presidential press conferences passed their
sixty-first anniversary in March, 1974. Therefore, it
seems appropriate to reassess the presidential meetings
with the press and their role in government-citizen
communication. Several facts suggest a study at this
time of this unique presidential-press institution
—
presidential press conferences. Their use has made them
a recognized form of presidential communication in the
United States > their format has been changed by each
V/hite House administration. As a rule, either presidents
or the press have been dissatisfied with their number
and/or format; in the Nixon administration they were
used less than in any past administration since the
inauguration of the formally scheduled press conference.
The meetings with the press are the primary
institutionalized form of communication that permit
1964), p. 104.
Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President (New York,
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dialogue between a president and the Fourth Estate, and
thus, between a chief executive and his American publics*
Other forms of transmission, extending, from leaks at one
extreme to speeches at the other, are one-way by nature,
lack necessary feedback to the president and are more
controlled forms of presidential communication than press
conferences. Indeed, former Presidential Press Secretary
George Reedy has said that presidential press conferences
are the only area of communication that allow a president
2
to **. . .brush up against reality with regularity."
In the most recent Presidential administration,
President Nixon was accused by the Associated Press
Managing Editor's Association of ". . .killing off the
3presidential press conference."-^ Nixon had the fewest news
conferences of record since the advent of the scheduled
press conference during the Woodrow Wilson administration.
Nixon, moreover, steadily decreased the number of televised
press meetings during his term in office. Further, he
turned away from the generally accepted format of the press
conference to interviews and partisan-type news conferences
as media criticism increased about his administration's
.
Watergate scandal. This raises questions concerning
presidential press conferences of the future.
2George Reedy, "Some Questions for the President,"
New York Times , January 6, 1971 » p. 6.
^New York Times , February *f, 1972, p. 10.
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The main purposes of this study were to examine
Nixon's uses of presidential press conferences, his views
of presidential press conferences as well as the
increasingly abrasive relationship with the press as
reflected in his press conferences. For purposes of
comparison, secondary attention was given to other
presidential views, uses of, and problems with press
conferences to provide a base line for examining Nixon's
conferences. Finally, problems involved in presidential
news conferences and methods of improvement were examined.
James E. Pollard's two-volume study titled, The
Presidents and the Press , and The Presidents and the
Press, Truman to Johnson
, is the most exhaustive history
of the American presidential press conference. Pollard
offers few solutions for improving news conferences,
however, and his work ends with the Johnson administration*
Delbert McGuire's doctoral dissertation, "Democracy's
Confrontation j The Presidential Press Conference," was
published in 19&7. McGuire focused on the problems of
the presidential press conference as seen by correspondents,
White House press aides, and former President Eisenhower.
A second dissertation, "The Use of Radio and TV by
Presidents of the United States," completed by
Glen D. Phillips in 1968, bears on this thesis.
Two M.A. theses relate to this study. "The
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Presidential Press Conference! Nixon and Kennedy in
the 'First 100 Days'," by Dorothy Dunn, of the
University of Georgia, 1969* is a comparison of Nixon
and Kennedy press conference problems and news generated
at presidential press conferences during their
"honeymoons'* with the media. The second thesis,
"Television and Presidential Politics 1952-1970," by
Afton Auld, of the University of Kansas, 1970, is an
examination of the relationship between television and
four presidential administrations.
Numerous books have been written that include
frequent mention of presidential press conferences.
Those most relied upon for this thesis were George
Reedy' s, The Twilight of the Presidency , William J.
Small's, Political Power and the Press and David Wise's,
The Politics of lying . In 1971. Edward P. Morgan
( et al. ) transcribed the proceedings of several
correspondents at the Rational Debate Seminars in
Washington, D.C., sponsored by the America:: Enterprise
Institute in a short volume titled, The Presidency and
the Press Conference . Comments by various seminar
members provided much of the general background
information for this research.
None of the work noted above encompasses all of
the Nixon press conferences, nor do the studies
accommodate the ta3k of studying the history of the

Xnews sessions in terms of the advent of radio and TV.
No research focuses exclusively on the history of
presidential press conferences. Such a history would
provide a measuring device for Nixon press meetings.
The basic questions that served as guidelines
for this research and writing were*
1. How have scheduled presidential press
conferences changed since their beginning
in 1913?
2. What outside factors might have contributed
to presidential press conferences diminishing?
3. Since 192l-5» as press conferences have
generally dwindled, have speeches and press
statements increased?
4. Why was Nixon accused of M . . .killing off
the presidential press conference."?
5. In light of Nixon's problems with them, how
can presidential press conferences be made
workable in a society of instant mass communication?
A review of primary and secondary sources was
conducted in the Wisconsin State Historical Library
and the Memorial Library at the University of Wisconsin,
Madison.
Primary sources included presidential press
conference transcripts and press interpretive reaction
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available on microfilm. Transcripts used were taken
from the New York Times , The Congressional Quarterly
and Public Papers of the Presidents . *" Selected
transcripts of key press conferences as defined by
historians and viewed by media spokesmen, dating back
to the Eisenhower administration, were reviewed in
terms of the specific objectives noted above.
Questionnaires aimed at improving presidential
press conferences were mailed to available past
presidential press secretaries asking them to comment
on the advisability of informal presidential news
conferences called on short notice, held in conjunction
with a single scheduled televised monthly meeting with
the press.
Questionnaire responses were disappointing. Of
the half-dozen only two were answered: those of
George Reedy and George E. Christian. Their suggestions
are relied on frequently in this research. Most other
presidential press secretary observations regarding
press conferences were gleaned from secondary sources.
The framework of this manuscript will start with
a discussion of press conferences as one of several
modes of communication from a president to the American
people, and then examine the institution of the
scheduled presidential press conference since its birth
in March 1913. Next, this history will take readers

xii
through the formative Richard Nixon years, looking at
some of his views of the press from his involvement
in the Alger Hiss case to the 1968 eve of his first
term as President. A chapter will "be devoted to each
of Nixon's terms as President of the United States.
Finally, this paper will offer some alternatives for
consideration regarding the future of presidential
press conferences.
A procedural problem with definitions needs some
space in this introduction. Early in research
difficulty was found with deciding exactly what were
to be called Nixon press conferences. Other historians
have had the same problem. The following definition
was finally selected for this analysis: "any scheduled
meeting by the President with ten or more members of the
press where questions were asked, and answered, and
recorded verbatim." Until the Roosevelt administration,
even that definition will cause a communication historian
problems. The number "ten," selected to define the
k
Delbert McGuire, "Democracy's Confrontation*
The Presidential Press Conference, I," Journalism
Quarterly
,
(Vol. Wt, No. k .) Winter, 1967, p. 639.
McGuire defined presidential press conferences as 1
"
. .
.those meetings between the President and the press
for an exchange of questions and answers provided that
the transcript is on record." That definition would
have included Nixon's "conversations" and interviews
and was, therefore, rejected.
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requisite reporter population at a press conference,
was arbitrary and selected to separate conferences
from group interviews and so forth. -.-Presidential
press statements, where reporters are allowed no
questions, are likewise excluded from the definition.
Attendance by radio or television representatives was
not a criteria in the definition.
Other procedural problems included differentiating
between "formal" and "informal" press conferences. For
this research a formal presidential news conference
was defined simply as one scheduled at least 12 hours
in advance.
Much of the data in Tables III and IV were taken
from research by Pollard and Wise and are so footnoted.
Where data have been updated, this writer has used the
New York Times Index as his primary source.
The terms "press conference" and "news conference"
have the same meaning in this research.
Before moving to the subject of development of
presidential news conferences some general comments
about their place in the public information system
and their characteristics are needed.
The press conference is, of course, only one of
several methods of presidential communication. A
listing of other modes is extensive and includes both
legal and extra-legal channels and devices for the
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President to communicate to the American public, and
to the world. James Pollard in The Presidents and the
Press, Truman to Johnson lists 25 alternatives that
include formal messages, proclamations, White House
statements, official memos, speeches, executive orders,
presidential letters, fireside chats, radio and TV
broadcasts, press secretary announcements, and so forth.
Of the presidential alternatives noted, he says probably
about a half dozen are used as major tools in
communicating with publics. He includes the use of
rumors, or leaks, and backgrounders as means of
c ommun i c ati on . •*
One may establish a communication continuum of
attribution that ranges from a rumor or leak at one
extreme, evolves to a deep backgrounder, then to a
backgrounder, then to attributed statements and
announcements by the president's staff. In the center
is the press conference itself. From there the
continuum moves to the other more formal extreme of
press statements, speeches and executive orders. The
link with the obscuring devices and easily identifiable
executive communication is the presidential press
conference.
*James E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press,
Truman to Johnson, (Washington, D.C., 196^), pp. 13-15.
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Dorothy Dunn made an important point regarding
the importance of presidential press conferences i
Any leverage the President has acquired
in the law-making process has been indirect,
based on use of persuasion and ultimately
grounded in the popular support he can claim
or mobilize at a given time. Except for the
veto, the President has no constitutional
means of either setting major policy himself
or forcing the legislative branch to his
views. Hence his link with the public is
his key relationship."
The press conference provides one of the most rapid
links with the public and as such becomes a tool for
presidential reception as well as transmission. News
conferences, perhaps because of that unique quality,
have been almost without exception a source of
controversy.
They have several advantages. News conferences
provide a president with a direct means of announcing
his policy, or action, and explaining his thinking
surrounding those matters. The meetings with the press
provide immediate national, and worldwide communication
of matters of significance and interest to the public.
News conferences are a form of alerting and shaping
Dorothy Dunn, "The Presidential Press
Conference: Nixon and Kennedy in the 'First 100
Days,'" M.A. Thesis, University of Georgia, 1969t




public opinion. Finally, they are an opportunity
for the American people to question their chief, albeit
via the press, on his policy, and tend to make him
responsive to his publics.'
Press conferences have disadvantages, however.
They lack regularity and uniformity. A president may
elect not to answer questions put to him by the press
by rebuking the reporter, relying on a "no comment"
answer, or simply evading the question. Depending on
one's view, another disadvantage is that the president
is at the mercy of grandstanding reporters who may be
more interested in their personal image than in the
question they are putting to the president. Wore, the
impromptu nature of the news conference lends itself
o
toward presidential innaccuracies in matters of fact.
Beyond those drawbacks are problems of a president
using the news conference as a political advantage
over opponents, his telling only one side of the story
Q
or simply placing an "embargo" on news.^
A press conference with too many reporters, limited




^William J. Small, Political Power and the Press ,
(New York, 1972), pp. 1^3-^5.
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to a time frame of about 30 minutes after a long period
of news conference inactivity, is conducive to a
confused and boisterous meeting as reporters compete
for presidential attention. The situation needs improve-
ment with respect to allowing a more orderly environment
and follow-up questioning. Improvement must be made,
however, without sacrificing the full and free discussion
of American presidential press meetings;
Conference advantages and disadvantages must be
weighed against the usefulness of the press conference
as a fact-finding tool not only for the press and the
people, but also for a president. White House
correspondent Helen Thomas has noted the value of a
press conference in questioning the chief executive
on information that the president would not normally
volunteer. George Reedy, on the other hand, believes
the press to be the most effective social institution
tending to keep a president in touch with reality.
As will be seen in the first Chapter, the
difficulties found in press conferences have not been
confined to any single presidential administration.
Edward P. Morgan ejt al
.
, The Presidency and
the Press Conference, (Washington, D.C., 1971),
pp. ^2-^3.
George E. Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency ,
(New York, 1970), p. 99.
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Each president has had to find his own method for
conferences and the press has had to adjust.
Presidential success has varied with srespect to those
extra-legal and non-Constitutional meetings with the
Fourth Estate j those successes and failures will be
reviewed here next for the purpose of establishing a




THE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE
FROM WILSON TO JOHNSON
In our America we have the finest and
best press in the world. In its power
today only the press can sound the warning
and reason to that conviction which will
enable us to play our full part in this
work of preservation of our world civilisation.
—Warren G. Harding 1
April 1923
This chapter will examine aspects, of various chief
executives' news conferences for events relevant to
development and diminution of press conferences as a
means of presidential communication with the American
people. As such, it will discuss salient events in
the evolution of the press conference that brought it
to its present-day form. Past presidential views, uses
and problems with the meetings, as well as influences
by press secretaries and the electronic media, will be
used to focus on the use and decline of the press
conference in the Nixon administration.
The first presidential press conference, called as
James E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press ,
(New York, 1?46) , p. 711.

a scheduled event, was held on March ,15 % 1913 by
2Woodrow Wilson. Although press conferences had been
held earlier by other presidents, the administration
of Wilson is used as a starting point for this
research because he initiated them as regularly
scheduled events. In that historic meeting Wilson
expressed the hope that newsmen would help the public
understand important issues and disregard trivia.
Described as nervous and embarrassed because of the
large number of reporters (125) » he expressed his
views of the meetings
i
I sent for you. . .to ask that you go
into partnership with me, that you lend me
your assistance as nobody else can, and then
after you have brought. . .opinion into
Washington, let us try and make true gold
here that will go out from Washington.
3
He viewed news conferences as an important source
of feedback, saying ". . .do not tell the country what
Washington is thinking, for that does not make any
difference. Tell Washington what the country is
thinking. ..."






3behind the President—Wilson was seated at his desk
—
reacted with marked surprise v/hen Wilson referred the
press to "My Dear Friend Tumulty" [sic] for general
press information.^
Tumulty has been described as the "first secretary
to have a flair for public relations." Called the
"Weather-vane" of the administration, the 3^ year-old
Irishman was noted for sensing the sentiment of the
country and ".
. .the state of mind of the people."
He created an early press digest, called the "Yellow
Journal"—news clippings were pasted on long yellow
sheets—used to analyze press sentiment. There were no
public opinion polls: newspapers and magazines, along
with political scouts, were used to provide Wilson
his needed feedback, imperfect though it may have been.
Wilson's biweekly press conferences were not
considered successful by some historians. The President
considered the newspapermen's questions undignified,
and left his press relations more and more to Tumulty
7
as time passed.
^New York Times , March 16, 1913 » P. 2.
John M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era ,
(Boston, 195D» P. 61.
7 Ibid., pp. 61-65.

Wilson is credited with introducing off-the-record
remarks at the meetings, frequently prefacing a state-
ment with ". . .this is not to be printed but is just
a guide to you." He did not select press conference
subject matter and let reporters roam to whatever
Q
subjects they liked.
The fledgling electronic media had no influence
on Wilson's press conferences, of course. Wilson was,
o
however, photographed on silent film and delivered
his "Fourteen Points" speech to a world public by
wireless. In 1918 Wilson used radio for a broadcast,
but the medium was still in its infancy and only a small
number of listeners was able to hear him. They heard
mostly fleeting, almost indistinguishable words.
The Wilson news conferences were finally stopped
when the President became angered at what he believed
was unnecessary prying into his family life, especially
that of his daughters. That occurred after the
sinking of the Lusitania , in 1915* and the need for
8Small, Political Power and the Press , pp. 80-81.
^New York Times , December 5» 1913 » p. 20.
10Glen D. Phillips, "The Use of Radio and
Television by Presidents of the United States," Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968, p. 49.
Hereafter cited as Phillips, "Radio and Television."
Pollard, Presidents and the Press , p, 637*

5war-time security was listed as the reason for the
cessation. When the President stopped seeing reporters
himself, Secretary Tumulty served as' the intermediary.
He gave out news, answered some questions and, when
necessary, relayed queries to Wilson. Between 1915
and 1917 » however, Tumulty's influence on Wilson waned
and with the passage of the Espionage Act in June 1917
»
George Creel and the Committee on Public Information
12became the White House link with the public.
Records of Wilsonian press conferences do not give
precise figures of the number of press conferences that
he held. He is said to have conducted the conferences
13
twice each week, from 1913 to 1915 » however. J
Woodrow Wilson's primary contribution to the
Presidential press conference was converting the
previous haphazard relationship of press meetings to a
standardized forum. His recognition of its importance
enhanced the influence of White House correspondents
and gave the President direct access to a vital com-
munication channel.
1 Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership
of Public Opinion , (Bloomington, Indiana, 1965") » P. 32}
Pollard, Presidents and the Press , pp. 659-83.
13 Ibid. t Pollard, p. 630.
1/fIbid. f p. 691.

6Regular press conferences were revived in 1921
when Warren Gamaliel Harding, an Ohio newspaper
publisher, came to office. ^ As with Woodrow Wilson,
the exact number of news conferences held by the 29th
President has not been determined accurately. No
verbatim records were made. It is known, however,
that Harding made the press conference a permanent,
scheduled event and held one twice weekly. Historians
have found evidence of 16 press conferences during the
first three months of the Harding administration with
the attribution "high officials in the Administration." '
Harding has been credited with creating the "White
House spokesman" device which sometimes prohibited
1 ft
reporters from quoting a president directly. The
technique of the "White House spokesman" rule was
unpopular with reporters, but was continued by his
19
successors until Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office. 7
^Sraall, Political Power and the Press , p. 81.
Donald F. Keller, "George Christian and the
Press Relations of Warren G. Harding from Marion, Ohio,
to the White House." M.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin,
1972. p. 158. Hereafter cited as Keller, George Christian."
17Ibid.
1 ft
Small, Political Power and the Press , p. 81.
19Ibid., p. 8*1.

7In an interview in July 1971 t John F. Christian
—
son of George 3. Christian, Jr., Harding's "press"
secretary—explained the non-attribution policy of the
Harding Presidency
i
Harding v/anted to give the reporters the
real inner workings of the Presidency. That
was why he chose to meet with them after the
Cabinet discussions. When he spoke confiden-
tially (off the record) he wanted his confidence
preserved. He also felt that not being quoted
directly would leave the door open for a freer
exchange of questions and information. 20
The rule was not always applicable, however
i
instances have been found where Harding was quoted
directly. 21
The Harding Presidency was first in requiring
written questions be submitted in advance of a press
22
conference by newsmen. A question box was installed
outside the Presidential Office, and reporters filed
questions in writing before they entered the conference,
(An historical inaccuracy is that the box was installed
as a result of a Presidential faux pas on December 20,
1921, in press conference remarks regarding Japan's
status in a proposed Four-Power Treaty that included
20Keller, "George Christian," p. 148.
21New York Tiroes , March 8, 1921, p. 1.
22Small, Political Power and the Press , p. 81.

8France, Great Britain and the U.S. Donald F. Keller
successfully disproves that hypothesis by showing the
policy of written questions was announced at an earlier
conference on November 29 and first used on December 2,
1921.P
Harding's press conferences attracted over 100
reporters as a rule, and the written questions
continued at least as late as March 1923 » five months
oh
before his death.
The one-time publisher of the Marion (Ohio) Star
reportedly viewed the Fourth Estate as an important
part of presidential communication. Robert T. Barry,
Washington correspondent of Editor & Publisher , wrote
in 192^ that n . . .[Harding has] a very keen appreciation
of the fact that newspaper men [sic] represent the
25public in Washington." J
Election year 1920 is generally regarded by scholars
as the year of radio's birth as a practical instrument
of communication. Harding used the new medium




->Pollard, Presidents and the Press , p. 703.
Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 50.

9periodically during his administration, even up to his
fateful Alaskan tour in 1923. The Presidential car of
his train was specially equipped forc public broadcasts.
The President spoke over WEAR from Baltimore and KSD
in St. Louis that year. According to the New York Times
,
however, he was not altogether successful. The Times
noted the "mechanical contrivances" worried him, he
thought too much about the microphone and his speaking
27
manner was affected. ' One edition, noting his broadcast
went "hundreds of miles" said the President v/as hindered,
being glued to "the mouthpiece of the radio-telephone
op
amplifiers." Harding, sometimes forgetting he was
"live," left his microphone v/hile gesturing to his
audience.
Other media were in an experimental status during
Harding's administration. The President, however, was
given an invitation by a committee of the Motion Picture
Theater Owners Association to use motion pictures to
reach the nation "for the welfare of the people."
Harding urged the use of Governmental (Naval) radio
29facilities for press and commercial messages.
27Ibid., p. 51.
28New York Times , June 25, 1923. P. 2.




Warren Harding brought the advantage of a newsman's
point of view to the V/hite House. By reinforcing
Wilson's pattern of press conferences and by keeping them
on a permanent basis, Harding reinforced official
recognition of a still developing mode of presidential
communication.
When Calvin Coolidge entered the White House, he came
as no stranger to press conferences. Though he was
reticent to use them as Vice-President, believing they
could embarrass the Chief Executive, he had conducted
them frequently as Governor of Vermont.-' It was a
surprise to newsmen, however, that Coolidge, who had
been "an almost impossible source of copy" as Vice-
President, continued the Harding tradition of two press
conferences a week. . He retained the basic mechanics of
his predecessor's news conferences although he did allow
impromptu follow-up questions to written queries.-'
The 30th President saw the press regularly during his
term in office, for a yearly average of 87 Presidential
32press conferences.
His press conferences have been described as dull
-'Robert A. Woods, The Preparation of Calvin
Coolidge
.
(Boston, 192*0, p. I65~^and 246. ~
^ Ibid., p. 2*1-8 f Pollard, Presidents and the Press .
P. 715.
* Small, Political Power and the Press, p. 82,
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and pallid. Frank R. Kent, a Baltimore Sun correspondent,
wrote an article about the Coolidge news conferences in
the American Mercury t
Mr. Coolidge does not smile. He utters
no greeting, does not even nod his head. There
is a dour, discouraged look about him. He seems
not to be pleased. He puts on his horn-rimmed
glasses, glances at the top question of the
sheaf he holds in his hand, and passes it to the
bottom. He silently reads a second question and
passes that to the bottom, too. The reporters
are respectfully expectant. Finally, he finds
a question which he reads aloud and answers,
then another, and another. His voice corresponds
to his appearance. V/hat he says is mostly non-
committal, neutral, evasive. To many questions
he replies that he has no exact information on
the subject but expects to have it shortly, or
that he is informed some department has the
matter in hand and is handling it in a satis-
factory manner. Even when his replies are
definite, which is rare, they are flat and
meatless. , , .33
Coolidge appeared to view newspaper conferences as
a means for making an appeal directly to the country.
Pollard notes that Coolidge showed no particular sign
of realizing the value of news conference feedback,
and viewed the sessions primarily as one-way communica-
tion from the President to the people, J
By 1923 radio was becoming an increasingly important
mode of presidential communication. Coolidge
—
perhaps
heeding advice that radio could conserve his strength




and help avert a repetition of the tragic deaths of
Wilson and Harding- -turned to the media more than his
predecessors. He delivered what might be considered the
first "network" Presidential broadcast in a message to
Congress, carried by six stations in December 1923. The
next year a coast-to-coast network of 22 stations carried
one of his speeches. The N.Y. Times called him "extremely
popular as a radio speaker," and Coolidge substantially
agreed
i
I am very fortunate that I came in with radio.
I can't make an engaging, rousing, or
oratorical speech to a crowd. . .but I have
a good radio voice, and now I can get my
message across to them without acquainting
them with my lack of oratorical ability or
without making any rhetorical display in
their presence, 35
In all, Coolidge made over kO radio addresses during
his term in office.
In 192^ a "phonofilm," a combination of a taped
radio speech synchronized with one of Coolidge's silent
films was made, but research fails to reveal if it was
ever improved on in that form. The "phonofilm" concept
gave way to "talkies," though Coolidge never made use
of them. 36
•^Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 52,
3
°New York Times , March 3. 1929t Sect. IX,
August 12, 192*1, p. 38j March 9. 1929, p. 13.

13
Coolidge had some problems with press conferences
other than their monotony. On one occasion he was
angered when a reporter made editorial note of a passed-
by question and Presidential silence. Coolidge
criticized the news report saying it was not in the
spirit of his press conference rules. ^' Another time,
Coolidge departed from the Harding rule of no direct
quotation and allowed newsmen to quote him directly on
the subject of brokers' loans, causing a charge that
the President had helped encourage an inflationary
trend. The incident prompted Coolidge to write in his
autobiography, "The words of the President have enormous
weight, and ought not to be used indiscriminately."-'
Probably Coolidge' s greatest contribution to
Presidential press conferences was simply his insistence
on their continuation.
Herbert Hoover had ?>k press conferences during
his first two years in office. Like Coolidge, he
continued the custom of using written questions at his
meetings.-^ He began his term as President, however,
37New York Times , May 18, 1927, p. 27.
3 8Pollard, Presidents and the Press , pp. 725-27.
-^Small, Political Power and the Press , p. 82.

14
by making an announcement at his first press conference
that would partially abolish the rule of not quoting
the President directly, and allow some news to be used
40in background form. Hoover made the announcement to
some 200 surprised reporters while standing, hand in
pocket, behind his desk. The New York Times lauded the
"death of the White House spokesman, " and quoted the
President directly in his first meeting with the press.
Hoover's motive was one of avoiding embarrassment to
himself or other officials because of ambiguous
attribution. He promised that for complete clarity, he
would either dictate quotes to reporters or provide them
"transcripts of stenographic reports of his words."
Hoover used press conferences and press statements
interchangeably. As his number of press conferences
decreased during the Depression, his press statements
increased. A tabulation of his Presidential years
shows the trend j
Pollard, Presidents and the Press , p. 7^1.
^New York Times, March 6, 1929 # p. 5i March 7»
p. Zk\ March 17, Sect. Ill, p. 1 and k\ February 3i
Sect. Ill, p. 1.
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Another innovation of the Hoover administration
was the official creation of the post of presidential
in
press secretary. J The President divided the
responsibilities of presidential secretary into a
larger four-man "Secretariat. " One member of the
new organization was George Akerson whose tasks mostly
related to dealing with the press. Because of that,
Akerson is generally regarded as the first presidential
press secretary. His duties were to facilitate press
conferences and press release dates as well as to
coordinate Presidential appearances or endorsements.
Lh.
Akerson also conducted press briefings. Briefings
by the press secretary were short-lived, however, and
fell into disuse after about three months when
-^Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover Off the Record ,
(New York, 193*0, P. 77.
Marietta A. Pane, "George E. Akerson: First
Presidential Press Secretary," M.A. Thesis, University




reporters suspected the secretary either did not know
the facts, or was trying to cover them up. * Akerson
resigned after two years and was replaced by
Theodore Joslin who was described as generally
unapproachable by the press.
Joslin, in his book, Hoover Off the Record , did
provide some information regarding Hoover's sense of
feedback t
[Hoover] read the metropolitan press daily. . .
supplementing these by maintaining an elaborate
clipping bureau. Articles were selected from
500 daily papers scattered over the countr
representing all shades of public opinion:m
As the chilling certainty of a depression became
apparent to him, Hoover is said to have used press
releases to inform the public and "cushion the first
shock of the Depression."
During the last months of his administration,
Hoover's isolation increased and press conference
cancellations were frequent t between June and
-'Pollard, Presidents and the Press , p. 7^2.
Charles F. O'Donnell, Jr., "Stephen Tyree Early*
F.D.R.'s Press Secretary," M.S. Thesis, University of
Wisconsin, 1967, p.15. Hereafter cited as O'Donnell, "Stephen
Tyree Early."
'Pollard, Presidents and the Press , p. 763.
ho
William S. Myers and Walter H. Newton, The
Hoover Administration, (New York, 1936), p. 15 » 23 and 4-5.
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mid-September 1932, Hoover saw the press only eight
times, two conferences were cancelled in one week in
November 1932, and during his four lame-duck months
in office no press conferences were conducted. James E.
Pollard describes the Hoover administration as having
Presidential press relations more strained than any
president since Theodore Roosevelt. 7
Hoover had made one radio- telephone speech
regarding the economy about a month after his
inauguration, and had spoken 3? times on radio after
22 months in office. Sound movies, as a matter of
record, had become functional and were scheduled for
Hoover's inauguration.^
At one point Hoover made a prophetic point
regarding radio, one that went unheeded in the Nixon
administration when he said that radio's worth
",
, .depends on the use that is made of it. It is
not the ability to transmit, but the character of what •
is transmitted that really counts."-'
°Pollard, Presidents and the Press, pp. 768-69
#
5°New York Tines, April 18, 1929. p. ^J
December 28, 1930, p. 1.
^1 Ibid., February 10, 1929, p. 3. Television was
also under consideration for reproducing the inaugural
ceremonies. The plan, however, was dropped for unknown
reasons.
52Phillips, "Radio and Television," pp. 53-5**.
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Certainly the forces arrayed against President
Hoover were among the severest of those facing any man
who had occupied the White House. Economic problems
increased his isolation and the final years of his
administration saw his relations sour with the press.
His greatest contribution to news conferences was
probably made during his first meeting with the press
when he relaxed the "White House spokesman" rule.
The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidency, in terras
of press meetings, was the most innovative since
Woodrow Wilson began regular news conferences.
Franklin Roosevelt conducted press conferences on
an average of two a week during his twelve years as
President for a total of 998." Midway through his
first term, he had conducted far more of them than would
any of his successors during the same periods of time.
Roosevelt stopped the custom of written questions
at his first news conference, defined conditions that
would allow him to be quoted directly, and delineated
^Pollard, Presidents and the Press, Truman to
Johnson
, p. 8.
' New York Tines, November 20, 1970, p. fcl. A
breakdown for the same time frame for later presidents
goes as follows 1
Truman - 84
Eisenhower - 53




what he meant by "back-grounders" and "off the record"
statements. See Appendix A.
Roosevelt increased his popularity with the press
by his invention of the "lid," a device that allowed
reporters to leave the White House during nights and
weekends when "the lid was on," knowing no news would
break in their absence, or that they would be recalled
should news be in the making. •*•*
Perhaps another reason for Roosevelt's popularity
with the press was his habit of attacking publishers
and newspaper owners, rather than reporters, in what
the President saw as an adversary relationship.
Roosevelt's biographer, J.M. Burns, commented on the
President's "news quizzes"
i
. . .He made so much news and maintained
such a friendly attitude toward the newspaper-
men covering the White House that he quickly
and easily won their sympathy. The newspaper-
men were especially pleased that the President
had reins tituted the press conference, thus
enabling them to question him directly. 57
Merriman Smith began his 30-year career of
-^Small, Political Power and the Press , p. 83.
56Ibid.
"*' James KacGregor Burns, Roosevelt 1 The Lion
and the Fox, (New York, 195^), p. 189.

20
White House coverage for United Press (later named
United Press International) during the Roosevelt
administration. Smith said of the President's charm
and crowd-rousing talents, "Franklin Roosevelt would
have been a wonderful actor. He probably would have
been a Shakespearean star. » . . "^
Roosevelt conducted most of his news conferences
informally in the White House Oval Office, usually
dressed in shirtsleeves. About 150 correspondents
CO
attended most meetings. ' Radio correspondents attended
the sessions, apparently only to take notes for later
broadcast. When sections of the House and Senate
galleries were opened to radio in 1939» the President
granted them "the same privileges of reporting allowed
newspaper correspondents." In fact, Roosevelt announced
that "presidential press conferences" would be changed
to "press and radio conferences," a term that was not to
endure in common usage. No evidence can be found
of any radio broadcast of Roosevelt press conferences,
although he did conduct radio interviews . Television
^Timothy G. Smith, ed. f Merriraan Smith's Book
of Presidents
,
(New York, 1972), p. 22 and 30.
5^New York Times , September 2, 1939 » p. 8|
March Ik, 1938, p. 1.
60Ibid., May 2, 1939. p. 6> July 9, p. 19.
Pollard, Presidents and the Press , p. 819.
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transmission had been developed to an effective range
of only about 50 miles by late 1939. 62
Roosevelt sometimes relied on radio to go over the
heads of newspapers. He innovated "fireside chats,"
described below, using them less frequently, however,
than often assumed—his average was about three a year. ^
Roosevelt and radio teamed together to develop a new
means of Presidential communication. In his first four
years in office the President spoke on radio over 200
times. Most of those broadcasts were carried by 200
different stations throughout the country. Mitchell
Charnley, the Minnesota scholar who saw the possibilities
of radio news, wrote j
As 1933 came in, then, radio listeners heard
full accounts of the attempt to assassinate
President Roosevelt at Miami. The new
President's inaugural on March b went out
on a record-breaking international hookup.
Eight days later Roosevelt initiated the
•fireside chat'—an event that was periodi-
cally to combine the President's striking
•radio personality' and exceedingly skillful
scripts with whatever news he chose to present,
all in a manner to build bigger and bigger
radio audiences among a people desperate for
relief from the depression. 65
62New York Times , September 1, 1939. p. 17.
^Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 62.
64-
New York Times , March 7, 1937 , Sect. XI, p. 12.
He spoke on NBC 108 times and CBS 95 times during
that period.
^Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 61.
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Roosevelt's unusual ability to monitor public
opinion has been noted by several historians. He
used an array that included the written media, letters,
conversations, telegrams, an editorial digest, party
reports and visits by political leaders. His news
conferences aided the process and he probably viewed
them as another tool in his feedback apparatus.
Arthur Krock noted that the Tuesday and Friday meetings
with the press were held primarily for Roosevelt's
"own end and not to account for his stewardship." ' He
also noted Roosevelt's use of press conferences for
"dropping surprises," or trial-balloons, on the press.
The President's decision to increase the membership of
68
the Supreme Court was one such example.
Roosevelt's skill in public relations in part came
from the long tutelage of the consummate teacher in
public relations, Louis KcHenry Howe. A long-time
friend and advisor to the President, Howe is described
as giving the White House an intimate, relentless watch
on public opinion > one whose major service was
relentless criticism. Howe has been called the "no"
Pollard, Presidents and the Press , pp. 795-96.
''New York Times , December 21, 19^ , p. 20
1
July 9, 1939, p. 19.
68Ibid., February 9, 1937, p. *K
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man from whom Roosevelt could never escape.
°
Apparently, Roosevelt viewed news conferences as
effective tools of foreign policy dissemination. He
held one in the American Embassy in Buenos Aires in
1936 where 50 Argentine reporters attended. On
another occasion he invited Uruguayan reporters aboard
the USS Indianapolis for a news conference.'
Stephen T. Early, Roosevelt's press secretary,
assisted the President throughout his 12 years in the
White House. He sat behind Roosevelt during the news
conferences and frequently advised the President
regarding appropriate answers. Early was responsible
for eliminating written questions. Early completely
dropped the attribution of "White House spokesman" in
his press briefings. He became, like his President,
71
an identifiable source of news.'
During his Presidency, Roosevelt set precedent
upon precedent for later news conferences. He invited
groups other than the Washington press corps to his news
conferences. One example was his press conference of
December 2?, 1935, when he spoke to a group of
^Alfred B. Rollins, Jr., Roosevelt and Howe ,
(New York, 1962), pp. 452-53.
' New York Times , December 2, 1936, p. If
December 4, p. 16.




72journalism teachers. His were the first presidential
news conferences to admit black reporters. Roosevelt
published the first transcripts of news conferences,
albeit well after the events.'-' He installed a radio
broadcast studio in the White House, using it to
supplement his press conference communication.'
As with other presidents, Franklin Roosevelt's
relations with the press declined during his last years
in office. Certainly the imposition of censorship
during World War II was a factor, and his isolation
from the press during his last months of declining
health increased the problem. The New York Tiroes
,
noting the relative paucity of news meetings in 19^
»
speculated on three occasions that Roosevelt's health
was the prime reason. The Times also pointed out that
his personal direction of war efforts and travel
(newsmen were usually barred from traveling with the
President for security reasons) had caused the decline.-*
'Pollard, Presidents and the Press , p. 783.
"^New York Times , February 9, 19kk, p. 21;
March Ik, 1938, p. 1. Transcripts of his March 1933
to March 193^ press conferences were released to the
press in 1938.
7 New York Times , July 30, 1933 » Sect. IX, p. 7
1
Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 67.
7
^Ibid., January 15, 19^t p. 15 1 January 31t
p. li February 1, p. 18.
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Roosevelt's span in office had an important
influence on later presidential press conferences. In
many respects his Presidency may be used as a prime
measuring device for other presidential news conferences.
In terms of style, frequency and effectiveness at
communicating during periods of American crisis,
Franklin Roosevelt was a rarity among presidents.
Arthur Krock compared President Truman's meetings
with the press to those of Roosevelt early in 19^5
and wrote that Truman's were more business-like. Krock
noted they were "fact-filled," faster and more precise
—
leaving less need for questioning and probing than
had Roosevelt's. Krock wrote that Truman waited until
he had a "budget of important news to impart" before
the President called a conference. As an example,
Krock cited one Ik-minute press conference containing
76
about a dozen news articles—all important.
Truman reduced the number of news conferences to
one a week, with special conferences when he believed
them appropriate. He also cut the length of press




76Ibid., June 8, 19^5. P» 18.
''Pollard, Presidents and the Press , p. 8*4-6.
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Three hundred and forty-eight correspondents
attended his first press conference and the meeting
ended after about 20 minutes. Truman ushered in one
of the chief news conference complaints of the 1970 'si
too many reporters, and too little time.
For his comparable number of months in office,
Truman held about half the number of press conferences
that Roosevelt had held. Truman's total during his
93 months in office was 324- news conferences. '*
The President allowed transcripts of the press
meetings to be issued, but he retained control of his
comments by requiring reporters to paraphrase most of
his remarks. After his first Presidential misstatements,
(their nature could not be determined in this research)
it was suggested that Truman return to the custom of
using written questions—at least for certain sensitive
topics such as international affairs—a suggestion
. , 80Truman rejected.
Probably because of the increasing number of
reporters attending news conferences (questioners could
not always be identified, nor questions clearly heard
in the crowded office) Truman moved the location of the
?8Ibid., p. 8^7.
''Small, Political Power and the Press, p. 86.
80New York Times, October 25, 19^6, p. 22.
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meetings from the Presidential Office to the Indian
Treaty Room in the Executive Office Building.
The move gave reporters the chance to sit down and
take notes during press conferences, and eliminated
one cause of complaint during the Roosevelt
op
administration.
Other innovations required the reporters to
identify themselves before each question, causing what
was criticized as a "yo-yo H effect as they stood up
and sat down. -*
Another major step in his Presidential press
conferences was the use of television film. Television
reporters narrated the substance of Truman's remarks
ah
over silent film of the meetings.
When the conferences were moved from the White
House, Presidential Press Secretary Joseph Short
arranged to have tape recordings made of the meetings.
The arrangement improved the long-standing problem
faced by reporters of waiting hours or days for a
typed transcript. At the ends of the sessions




, Presidency and the Press
Conference, p. 48.
83Ibid., p. 16.
Small, Political Power and the Press , p. 8?.
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questioned statements were played back for
Of
clarification. ° Elaborate U.S. Army Signal Corps
equipment was installed in the Indian Treaty Room to
replace a standard office dictating machine. In
July 1951 i Congressional Democratic leaders were offered
copies of press conference transcripts. When the
offer was accepted, there was little advantage in
keeping transcripts under control of the White House
any longer. With the recordings, it was a short step
to releasing portions of them for radio broadcast. For
the first time entire sentences and paragraphs of
presidential press conferences were released, and
actualities of the meetings were used on radio newscasts.
Television became a reality of presidential "live"
communication in October 19^7. A broadcast by the
President appealing for public cooperation in a
conservation program marked the first time television
fi7
was used for a broadcast from the White House. '
Truman was a less successful speaker than Roosevelt
and television came to his aid. One writer, Ben Gross,
8
^New York Times , October 14-, 1951 » Sect. VI,
p. 62.
Ibid
. 1 Cornwell, Presidential Leadership ,
p. 17 2*.





The Missourian lacks polish j his. delivery is
pedestrian; his voice, at best, "only average,
and the content of his addresses devoid of
those flashes of eloquences which mark the
truly distinguished speaker. All of these
defects were highlighted on radio. In fact,
it is safe to say that, without television,
Truman might have been remembered as one of
our duller political spellbinders. But
with the camera added to the microphone,
his speeches gained not only the added
dimension of sight but also the important
one of person-to-person appeal. 88
Although television helped Truman, he used it
very little in comparison to his successors. He
generally relied on radio to communicate with the
89people. Truman's use of radio was probably influenced
by the Federal Communications Commission's TV "freeze"
which lasted officially from September 19^8 until
April 1*4-, 1952. The first television construction
permits after the "thaw," however, were not issued
until February 1953. That month 70 licenses were




897Afton S. Auld, "Television and Presidential
Politics, 1952-1970," M.A. Thesis, University of Kansas,
1970, p. 2. Hereafter cited as Auld, "Television and
Politics."
"Rad io and Televsion News , August 1952, p. 10
1
February 1953 # P. 70.
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As was the case with most other presidents,
Truman's press conferences diminished in number during
his last year in office. Three were cancelled in June and
July, 1952, for excuses ranging from the heat to
Presidential illness. There was a two-month gap
between late September and mid-November that year.
Although the excuses varied, Truman's impending
departure from office was probably the reason underlying
the reduction in meetings with the press. The out-
going President no longer needed the press to accomplish
his objectives.
In his final Presidential press conference, on
January 15# 1953 » Truman summarized his views and uses
of press conferences*
. . .1 want to make it plain that I think
it is important for our democratic system of
government that every medium of communication
between the citizens and their government,
particularly the President, be kept open as
far as possible.
-
This kind of news conference where
reporters can ask any question they can dream
up—directly to the President of the United
States— illustrates how strong and how vital
our democracy is. There is no other country
in the world where the chief of state submits
to such unlimited questioning. . . .
I hope [succeeding Presidents] will
never cut out the direct line of communication
between themselves and the people. 91










Though all of [hisj changes seem,
individually, of minor consequence, their
cumulative impact was considerable. By the
time President Truman left office the highly
informal, personalized, almost casual press
conference of the past had become an increas-
ingly routinized, institutionalized part of
the presidential communications apparatus.
Preparation became elaborately formalized,
as did the conduct of the meetings themselves
in their new setting, with a growing array of
electronic aids. Finally, the nature of the
meetings as private encounters between the
Chief Executive and the newspaper representa-
tives was rapidly changing into a semi-public
performance (soon to become completely public)
whose transactions were increasingly part of
the public record. 92
With only minor variations, Presidential press
conferences as known in the 1970's originated during
the Eisenhower administration. During the President's
news conference on December 16, 1953—the first Presiden-
tial news conference to be recorded on tape for radio
broadcast in entirety—Eisenhower announced the policy
of allowing reporters to quote him directly, without
93limitation. ^




^P d, Presidents and the Press, Truman to
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James Hagerty, presidential press secretary
through both terms of the Eisenhower administration,
was the innovator freeing newspapers from presidential
ok
paraphrase. The New York Times began printing
verbatim transcripts of the sessions regularly. The
step forward in publicizing meetings with the Fourth
Estate during Hagerty' s tenure as presidential press
secretary was a great one, and he was described by one
historian as a greater policy maker than any other
9^press secretary. J
On January 19, 1955 » President Eisenhower held
the first press conference in which television and
96
newsreel cameramen were allowed to make sound movies.
A fast film had been developed that could be used in
the Indian Treaty Room without a large array of bright,
97hot lights.^' A month later the first complete TV film
of a presidential press conference was released. In
May 1955» at a "TV pioneer dinner" hosted by
Sponsor Magazine given in his honor for the work he had
ok7 Gordon A. Moon II, "James Campbell Hagerty's
Eight Years in the White House." M.A. Thesis, University
of Wisconsin, 1962, pp. 64—65. Hereafter cited as
Moon, "James Campbell Hagerty."
95Ibid., p. 146.
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done in arranging the showing of Presidential press
conferences, James Hagerty predicted color TV at
98future news meetings. 7
For some critics, TV was seen as a debasement of
the meetings as a profitable mode of communicating
with a president. Assuming a reporter could get
himself recognized, his question and Eisenhower's
answer were now formally transcribed, recorded,
taped and filmed. Almost before he could file his
copy, both the newsman and the President were being
viewed in living rooms across America.
Protagonists of the filming disagreed. They
viewed the newspaperman's loss as a public information
gain. They noted the effect of television in improving
communication between the government and the people.
The presidential press conference was never meant to
be a special preserve for reporters, they pointed out.
"
President Eisenhower agreed with the point when
he expressed his views on the conferences in an
interview after leaving office
i
Now, let's remember this: The [sic] press
conference is not for the benefit of the
98New York Times , February 2k, 1955 » P. 1^1
May 23, p. ^7.
^°Dunn, "Presidential Press Conference," p. 11.

3*
press and the newsman himself; it is for
the public, and when the President feels
that it is time to deliver some message
this is a good way to do it. . . .1 don't
think I would change the format too much
from what we had. Sometimes I was quite
regular about holding them, sometimes I
wasn't. I sometimes omitted them because
I saw nothing new on the horizon. Some
writers tried to make it look like I hated
these conferences and so on. This is far
from the truth. 100
In a decade, the presidential press conference had
made an evolution from informal shirtsleeve gatherings
of reporters around a president's desk to formal
electronic newscasts with an audience of millions.
Thus, Eisenhower's Presidency marked the beginning
of the era of television in the White House. When
the first televised press conference was recorded with
sound on film, Presidential Press Secretary James
Hagerty announced that the White House reserved the
right to edit the film. The option was seldom exercised,
but the policy that the spoken word of the President
remained under the control of the White House was
continued.
With the advent of television, however, the
number of Presidential press conferences further diminished.
100Ibid., p. 12.
101Small, Political Power and the Press , pp. 93-96.
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President Eisenhov/er held about 190 press conferences
during his 96 months in office, about one-half the
number President Truman had held during a similar
period of time. 102
Minor Eisenhov/er innovations included changing
the press conferences from Thursdays to Wednesdays
j
air-conditioning the press conference meeting room
—
a plea of reporters dating back to the Truman
administration} broadcasting, via Voice of America,
the first Russian translation of portions of an
American presidential press conference and the
appointment of the first woman associate presidential
press secretary, Mrs. Anne Williams Wheaton, v/ho
103
replaced Murray Snyder. ^
Contrary to belief among some historians, President
Eisenhov/er—rather than President Kennedy—held the
first Presidential press conference to be broadcast
on live TV. The broadcast occurred from the
St. -Francis Hotel in San Francisco during the Republican
National Convention in 1956* Eisenhov/er announced that
102
Pollard, Presidents and the Press, Truman to
Johnson
, p. 87.
103New York Times , June k, 1953 » P. 25 J August 3t




Richard Nixon would be kept on the Republican ticket
as Vice-Presidential candidate despite a serious effort,
backed principally by Harold E. Stassen, to replace
Nixon with another candidate.
During a meeting with the press on March 15 i 1956
the President noted his use of press conferences on
two occasions, once by responding to a question that
took him by surprise, saying, " . • .you know, every
morning over here I learn something." Moments later
he added
»
. . .1 rather like to get. . .questions
because frequently I think they represent the
kind of thinking that is going on. . . .
[[Reporter's] opinions.
. .have some value. . .
in any democratic government. 105
Eisenhower noted that the sessions caused him to
spend time reviewing his decisions and policies. Each
morning before a press conference, Eisenhower was
briefed on answers to anticipated reporter's questions
by representatives of the State Department, the CIA,
his military staff secretary and his press secretary.
Depending on expected questions other key staff members
or experts in a particular field were invited.
10i
*Ibid., August 23, 1956, p. 12j p. 53.
105Ibid., March 15. 1956, p. 22.
Robert L. 3ranyan and Lawrence H. Lars en, eds.,




While Eisenhower has been described as never
knowing reporters and being ". . .suspicious, and
never fully trusting them," President Kennedy was the
107
opposite. '
President-elect John Fitzgerald Kennedy took the
advice of his soon-to-be press secretary, Pierre
Salinger, and introduced live television at Presidential
news conferences on a regular basis. Though
Kennedy was the third President of the television age,
the decision was not an easy one. It represented a
radical departure from press conference tradition.
Until Kennedy, modern American presidents had all
insisted on at least a minimum of censorship of their
press conferences. Roosevelt and Truman, save for
specific permission, would not let the press quote
them directly. Eisenhower, through Hagerty, allowed
the first use of exact quotes in transcripts and on
film and tape, but still maintained editing rights
—
though seldom exercising them.
Hagerty's thin margin for Presidential disclaimer
was erased, however, at President Kennedy's first press
conference on January 25, 1961. Arguments against
the move were voiced by both the press (Merriman Smith




[UPl], Edward Folliard [Washington Post], Robert
Donovan [New York Herold Tribune] and Raymond Brandt
[St. Louis Post Dispatch] ) and Presidential advisers
(McGeorge Bundy, Ted Sorensen and Dean Rusk). Primary
opposition came in the form of arguments aimed at
possible Presidential "fluffs" or slips in sensitive
foreign policy subjects; that live conferences would
place newspapers at a deadline disadvantage or become
"sideshows;" that using newspaper people as "props"
would prohibit necessary depth questioning. "
Kennedy's first press conference was also different
in another respect. The President moved it to the
State Department Auditorium to accommodate growing
media attendance. The auditorium was new and specially
designed for TV. 110
As a rule the press conference technique met with
approval. Though conducted at an off-viewing hour,
6 p.m. (EST) the seven-city Arbitron ratings—CBS -
12.8; N3C - 12.3; ABC - 8.2—were high for the time spotP1
109Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy , (Garden City,
New York, 1966), pp. 5^-58
Dunn, "Presidential Press Conference," p. l^i




Newsweek was critical of the conference, however
i
Standing between the flags of the U.S. and
the Presidency, the tips of his fingers stroking
the sides of the walnut lee turn before him,
Mr. Kennedy seemed remote from the newsmen on
the floor. As Peter Lisagor, Washington bureau




'When I got up to ask a question, I felt like I
was addressing the United Nations Assembly. *112
Thus, bringing the public closer to the President,
in what Salinger viewed as a Roosevelt tactic of taking
a case directly to the people—as in a "fireside chat* ---*
actually tended to make the President remote from the
press. More reporters attended the conferences and
clamor for Presidential recognition grew among
questioners. The long-standing intimacy between
president and press had been diluted by distance in
Ilk
the new State Department environment.
The changes brought other ground rules. Reporters,
unlike in the past, could not leave the conferences
until they were over. Truman's policy of making
correspondents identify themselves and their affiliation,
used to facilitate counterattacks on anonymous reporters
Ibid.
-^Salinger, With Kennedy , p. 56.
-^Auld, "Television and Politics," p. 53.
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with "hot" questions from the protection of the back
of the room, was dropped. Salinger was fearful that
reporters would use the unedited meetings to "plug"
the newspapers they represented, a ploy of Sarah
McClendon during Eisenhower press conferences. *
That first press conference was attended by over
400 reporters and viewed by an estimated 6$ million
Americans. Merriman Smith recalled that reporters
took relatively few notes during the meeting. The
transcript system had become efficient to the extent
of completing the first five or six pages of the
transcript by the time "Thank you, Mr. President"
ended the conference. The recording system for the
room included "shot gun" microphones that zoomed from
row to row as reporters stood to ask questions.
.
The President's news conferences became truly
public performances and as such could no longer serve
as semi-confidential briefings for the press.
David Halberstam has said that not only were live
televised press conferences good for Kennedy (and bad
for Congress, the Courts, and the Republican Party),
^Salinger, With Kennedy , pp. 57-59.
Dunn, "Presidential Press Conference," pp. 1^-15.
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they were good for television, making it more in demand.
Halberstara saidi
Kennedy's Presidency helped change the
entire balance of American politics. By the
time he left office, the Presidency, in large
part because of television, in part because of
his own style, had come to play a dominant
role in American life; he and the men around
him began to take on the roles previously
relegated to Hollywood stars.
. . .117
The Bay of Pigs incident, according to William J.
Small, one-time CBS Washington News Bureau manager,
may have marked the end of any Kennedy-press "honeymoon^
"News management" became a term associated with
the Kennedy administration. Arthur Krock said in
March 1963, that he found the administration guilty of
a news management policy ". . .enforced more cynically
and boldly than by any previous Administration in a
period when the United States was not at war." Krock
defined news management as suppression, concealment,
distortion, false weighting of the facts, threats,
shutting off sources, and even the "off-the-record"
device which operates ". . .without the imprint of
118
'David Halberstam, "Press and Prejudice,"
Esquire , April 197^, p. 113.















Extra space in the State Department audi-
torium plus the reduced pressure to take notes
encouraged a seating pattern that divided the
[Kennedy] assemblage roughly into three groups.
Reporters who seriously intended to ask questions
were either White House press corps "regulars"
with assigned seats in the front row or others
who found space in the first three rows.
Reporters who came largely to observe took
seats in the next four or five rows, and behind
them sat the nonjournalistic visitors. The
progressively relaxed rules for admitting the
latter underscored the increasingly public
nature of the conference. 119
119Dunn, "Presidential Press Conference," p. 16.
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authority and responsibility, and is open to repudiation
by its very source if repudiation becomes expedient."
The two-time Pulitzer prize winner noted the concept of
news management could be traced to President Harding's
120
"White House spokesman." The "news management" phrase,
however, was used as early as 19&3 °y James Reston when he
testified before a congressional subcommittee headed by
Rep. John Moss of California, The Moss Committee was
investigating the Kennedy administration's handling of
121
the press during the Cuban missile crisis. News
management came in for heavy criticism by the media. A
poll of Newsweek newsmen showed they believed there was
greater news management by Kennedy than his predecessor
but, surprisingly, that access to news was more available
122from Kennedy than Eisenhower.
120Arthur Krock, "Mr. Kennedy's Management of the
News," Fortune , March I963 , p. 82 ff.
Small, Political Power and the Press , p. 10*H
390.
Phillips, "Radio and Television,"; "How Much
Management of the News?, "1 Newsweek , April 8, 1963 1 P« 59*
1, Do you believe the Kennedy Administration engages
in practices that could be called "news management?''
Yes t 4-0 — No j 3
2, Do you believe the Eisenhower Administration
engaged in similar practices?
Yest 40 ~ Not 3
3, Do you have more, or less, access to news sources
in the Kennedy Administration than you had in the
Eisenhower Administration?
Moret 31 — Less 1 *f — Same 1 8
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As suspicions of management of the news grew, the
number of presidential press conferences diminished.
During his 34 months in office, President Kennedy held
63 press conferences, less than the average number held
by Eisenhower for a comparable time in office. •*
As noted, Kennedy viewed press conferences as
televised "fireside chats." He probably viewed them,
in conjunction with his extensive reading habit, as a
form of feedback, Salinger notes in his book that
Kennedy "scanned, regularly" 12 newspapers (none from
124
the West Coast) and 12 magazines. Robert Kintner
said that Kennedy was ".
.
.immensely conscious of the
significance of television. Whenever he appeared on
125
the screen, he wanted to know what his ratings were." J
Kennedy also hosted luncheons with editors and
publishers from various states to discuss "mutual
problems and matters of public concern." He is reported
4. Which Administration worked harder at it?
Kennedy: 29 — Eisenhower: 6 — Same: 3
5. If both did, which was more successful?
Kennedy: 18 — Eisenhower: 17




^Salinger, With Kennedy , p. 117.
12
^Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 106.
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to have viewed the Fourth Estate as a properly critical
126branch of government.
Late in 1962 President Kennedy allowed a televised
interview with representatives of the three networks.
The broadcast was taped in his office and set another
127precedent for his successors. ' Kennedy viewed
interviews as expansions of press conferences, a belief
properly criticized by Arthur Krock.
There v/ere other innovations and modern precedents,
some major, others not, set by President Kennedy. The
Telstar communications satellite broadcast the first
"live" American presidential press conference to Europe.
Kennedy introduced visual aides at his conferences such
as charts and maps, giving the meetings the appearances
of briefings and began to alter press conference times
of day to permit equal deadline treatment for morning
129
and evening newspapers. '
President Kennedy's assassination cut short other
possible developments in press conferences, leaving
speculation to historians willing to face "what if"-
type questions of the past. Kennedy may have extended
1 ?6
Pollard, Presidents and the Press, Truman to
Johnson
, pp. 95-96.
12?Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 10?.
12 New York Times , September 5, 1963, p. 30.
129Ibid., July 18, 1962, p. 6> March 24, 1961,
p.-lj November 12, 1963. P. 24.
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the use of his press conferences to a foreign policy
impact far beyond Telstar had he lived. He had granted
successful interviews with the editor- of lavestia •*
and one wonders if he was not on the verge of using
Franklin Roosevelt-like news conferences in an age of
international satellite communications.
As it is, Kennedy's administration will be noted
for bringing televised press meetings to maturity and
for eliminating any form of presidential censorship
from presidential press conferences.
President Lyndon Baines Johnson has been accused
of trying to turn the presidential press conference
131
"clock back to Truman." * The generalization, based
on Johnson's failure to use formal televised press
conferences in the Kennedy tradition or to provide an
environment for a verbatim transcript as had Eisenhower,
is tempting to accept.
While technical innovations in press conferences
were many—though largely minor— the President
experimented with such varied formats that make
categorization difficult.
1
^°Ibid., November 29, 1961, p. 1.
^Rowland Evans Jr. and Robert D. Novak,




Press conference locations were changed at the
whim of the President, ranging from the front porch
of his ranch or the White House Rose Garden to his
White House Office or the World's Fair Pavilion, and
even to 17-lap walks around the White House lawn.
They variously included correspondents' wives and
children and hay-bale rostrums. -*
After a trial-and-error period, the conferences
were taken to the White House Theater where some
technical changes were introduced. Johnson employed
a television prompting device for his opening statements,
or "voluntaries , " which were known to range up to
20 minutes i he used improved lighting equipment and
reflector devices to aid television cameras and in
1967 he conducted the first live televised presidential
133press conference in color. ^
James E. Pollard lists other differences in the
Lyndon Johnson press conferences from those of his
predecessor. Johnson was more "folksy" than Kennedy,
was more informal, and impromptu news conferences
became the new Presidential rule. The informal conference
132New York Times , April 28, I965 1 p. 17.
133Ibid., July 14, 1965, P. 20 j April 28, 1965.
p. 17i July 29, 1965» P. 12) August 26, 1965i p. 37i
March 10, 1967 1 p. 19.
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technique tended to limit the meetings to the regular
White House press corps, a group more dependent on a
president for news than outside reporters, and thus
more obligated to maintaining friendly press relations
with the White House. Johnson press conferences were
more frequent—26 in the first 182 days of office—but
134
were given on shorter notice. ^ During his five
years as President, Lyndon Johnson held 126 news
135
conferences. •*•*
One of Johnson's press secretaries, George Reedy,
described him as "dreading" televised news conferences,
but indicated that Johnson left each televised session
1 rsf.
with an improved "public image."
Reedy also noted a technical innovation in the
presidential press conference of having the White House
staffed with "warm" TV cameras standing by during the
working day to allow the President to appear instantly
on camera. ,' Johnson also introduced the use of a
lapel microphone, giving him greater mobility than past
3 Pollard, Presidents and the Press, Truman to
Johnson
, p. 113.
^-^David wise, The Politics of Lying . (New York,
1973), P. 359.
^^Reedy, Twilight of the Presidency , p. I63.




Reedy described other mechanics of late 1960*s
press conferences
i
On either side of the president [sic]
(but out of the lens angles) are signal
corps men with 'shotgun' microphones which
they point at each correspondent who is
recognized. Overhead is a rack designed to
give him precisely the lighting he wants.
The microphone into which he speaks is fed
into a "mult"—a device which permits all
the networks to pick up his voice without
the necessity of mounting a microphone on
the podium--which is also controlled by
the signal corps. 139
One historian notes an early Johnson tendency to
overuse the media and appear to say nothing, followed
by a later habit of greater restraint in the use of
the media, especially television. Tom Wicker in
a New York Times column agreed, drawing a comparison
between Johnson and Kennedy in their restraint shown
toward formal televised press conferences especially
during times of "diplomatic intricacies and political
pressures,"^
Johnson difficulties with press conferences,
^ McGuire, "Democracy's Confrontation," p. 38.
-^Reedy, Twilight of the Presidency , p. I63.
1*4-0
Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 135.
1
^New York Times , April 28, 1965. p. 17.
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beyond lacking the showmanship qualities of Kennedy
before large groups, probably were the result of his
other press problems. Johnson's habit of playing
favorites with certain reporters, his failure to
continue the once-criticized Kennedy-type conferences
on a regular basis, and his reputed "thin skin" about
media criticism all were minor contributers. A major
14-2
contributer was the "credibility gap."
Y/hile Kennedy and Eisenhower were accused of "news
management," Johnson was accused of creating a
"credibility gap," again suggesting the White House
was not to be believed. At the end of Johnson's term
in office, the professional journalism society, Sigma
Delta Chi, saidi
The Credibility Gap, which has reached
awesome proportions under the Johnson
Administration, continued to be a grave
handicap. Secrecy, lies, half-truths,
deception—this was the daily fare.
The report concluded that Johnson had the worst
record of credibility of any president in the history
1^3
of the country up to that time.
Clarification of terms is needed here. The phrase
1 2Auld, "Television and Politics," pp. 62-79.
119.
-'Small, Political Power and the Press, pp. 117-
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"credibility gap" is an etymological descendant of
Eisenhower's "missile gap" of the late 1950 's. David
Wise is credited with creating the "credibility gap"
term in May 1965» in a story for the New York Herald
Tribune , The words "credibility" and "gap," though
separate in the story were placed together by a headline
writer who put them in quotes. Later that year the
-th.il,
Washington Post helped popularize the phrase.
Growing dissent over civil rights and the Vietnam
War were other problems relating to Johnson's press
relations and his news conferences. By the spring of 1968
public opinion turned against his policies. The rage and
storm of dissidents reached the White House gates and
eventually even made most Presidential travel unsafe.
Johnson became ever more isolated from contact with
ike
reality beyond his secure sanctuaries, -*
;
Although Johnson was accessible to small groups
of reporters, or individual journalists, he avoided
large press conferences. Richard Strout of The Christian
Science Monitor , a veteran Washington correspondent
whose reporting dated to the Harding Presidency,
summarized the Johnson predicament with news conferences 1
1/j\ise, Politics of Lying t p. 32.
^Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 135i
Reedy, Twilight of the Presidency , p. 95.
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The presidential press conference itself
is very much what the President makes it. It
is an honorable, a salutary, and I think, a
necessary adjunct to our government, and I do
not like to see our profession let it wither
on the vine without a protest. . • .
Let me make it clear that when I refer
to a press conference I mean one announced
in advance and held in V/ashington. I do not
mean a sudden spur-of-the moment affair, nor
yet an ambulatory conference where the
President strides around the flower beds and
the puffing press pursues him.
President Johnson has been one of the
most accessible men to the press of any
President; that is in informal gatherings,
meetings with individual bureau chiefs, or
tips to favorite correspondents. But as
for formal press conferences, I can only
figure that he had nine last year. So far
in 1966 he has held only a few.
When a modern President foregoes the
regular press conference- -and I acknowledge
that it has many faults and is time consum-
ing and even irksome
—
you are apt to get a
substitute: government by leak, seepage,
or let me call it news-ooze. . .[this] may
be successful for awhile, but in time it
produces, I believe, a credibility gap, the
kind of gap which some think they see at
present. . . .
The normal discipline of a formal press
conference [would be] a perfect tool for him
to fill the credibility gap, if he were
prepared to use it. 1^6
One-time press secretary to Johnson, George E.
Christian, came to somewhat the same conclusioni
1 Dunn, "Presidential Press Conference," p. 19.
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Our. . .major problem involved frequency
of formal news conferences. Television and
radio wanted more of them, President Johnson
did not like the format, and many White House
regulars believed that the less formal office
conferences, with the opportunity for follow-
up questions, were much more informative. 1^7
In retrospect, President Johnson did little to
advance presidential press conferences. One may
philosophize that little was left to be done with them
in terms of format or technical advances. That, of
course, remains a mere speculation.
After leaving office Lyndon Johnson admitted his
apprehensive view of large televised news conferences
was a major shortcoming!
. .
.1 believe I should have held more
regular televised news conferences. I was
always more comfortable meeting with reporters
around my desk, as President Roosevelt did,
because it often gave us an opportunity to
explore questions in greater depth than in a
televised spectacular. Yet broadcast news
conferences are an effective means of
communicating with the public and should be
widely used by national leaders. 148
Over a period of about a half century presidential
press conferences were transformed from highly controlled
^^George E. Christian, Letter to Author,
October 28, 197 2*.
Ray Scherer, "The President's Powerful




and protective instruments of presidential communication
to live, color, prime time television close-ups that
allowed most Americans intimate views of their presidents--
and their president's ideas. As electronic media
developed presidential press conferences diminished.
Mass communication, ironically, tended to isolate
presidential communicators from their audiences.
As the period of mature presidential electronic
communication extended itself, the two-way communi-
cation of news conferences generally gave way to more
controllable one-way transmissions such as presidential
speeches and statements as Table I shows.
The notable exception to the trend in Table I,
President Johnson, may be partially explained by the
security constraints in the last years of his Presidency,
when militant protesters made even his speeches a
relative rarity.
As one might expect, radio usage, by itself,
during the same period tended to wane as television
became a preferred mode of communication. Table II
depicts the trend.
Each president's views of the conferences had
shaped his uses of them. Each had problems with them.
In less than a lifetime presidential press conferences
had developed along with the media and presidential











Truman 58 1 t 1.4
Eisenhower 73 1 i 3.4-
Kennedy 113 1 t 5.4
Johnson 60 1 t 2.6
Includes speeches, addresses, announcements and
statements whose texts are recorded in the New York
Times . Does not include presidential press confer-
ences, wires, letters, messages, declarations,
communiques, citations, toasts, reports, memos or
orders. Categories such as pleas or comments were
included in the tabulation when the circumstances




TOTAL PRESIDENTIAL USES OF
RADIO AND TV FOR SPEECHES
President Radio TV Both Total
Truman 28 1 8 37
Eisenhower 9 25 1*2 76
Kennedy 4 9 13
Johnson 2 17 3 22
SOURCE: New York Times Index, passim.
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vanishing point. Their electronic improvement and
presidential hesitation to use thera began to appear to
be their demise.
During its sixty-odd year span, the presidential
press conference tended to diminish in use near the
end of scheduled presidential terms. With only few
exceptions—Coolidge chief among them--presidents tended
to neglect press meetings after passing the midpoint in
their second term. Presidents traditionally held press
conferences to accomplish their objectives and as their
tenure in office waned they tended to use them less
frequently.
Space precludes analysis of press conference usage
in latter parts of presidential second terms, but it
may be generalized that a president's maintenance of a
steady press conference schedule is some indicator of
his public standing. Herbert Hoover and Lyndon Johnson
are extreme examples of Presidents who shunned the give-
and-take of news conferences as public opinion turned
against them in the final years of their administrations.
The most extreme example of press conference
isolation to date, however, may be seen in the final
Presidential years of Richard Nixon.

CHAPTER II
RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON AND
THE PRESS CONFERENCE! AN OVERVIEW
The imperfection of the news conference
vehicle is an excuse for not having more,
but it is not a valid excuse.
—Edward P. Morgan
November 1971
President Nixon cut himself off from what George
Reedy described as the most effective instrument of
communication to keep a president in touch with reality.
This chapter will discuss the overall uses of the
Nixon Presidential press conference and highlight some
of the early influences that may have contributed to
Nixon's infrequent and sometimes abrasive sessions with
the media.
Were numbers alone a sign of "killing off" the
presidential press conference, President Nixon would
have been found guilty. He called fewer Presidential
press conferences, on a yearly average, than any
president since Calvin Coolidge as Table III shows.
Moreover, the generalization of Nixon's down-
grading the presidential press conference can be










Wilson unclear 8 unclear
Harding unclear3 2 64b
Coolidge 520 6 87
Hoover 66 4 17
Roosevelt 998 12 81
Truraan J2k 8 42
Eisenhower 190 8 24
Kennedy 6k 3 21
Johnson 126 5 23
Nixon kzc 6 7
SOURCE j For Coolidge see Sraa!
and the Press, p. 82. For Hoover
Presidents and the Press, p. 7^1.
through Truman see Pollard, The Pi












through Johnson see Wise, The Pol: L. P. ^57.
a„..Sixteen press conferences have been found in the
first three months in office.
Approximation.




as a channel of communication with the public between
1969 and 1973. Until late 1973 1 when Watergate
pressures were clearly reaching Presidential level,
the use of televised press conferences was cut yearly,
as Table IV shows.
Though frugal with televised press conferences,
Nixon was accurately referred to, by one historian, as
"the supreme prime-time President." In his first year
and a half he was on prime time, for speeches and announce-
ments, more than Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson combined
in their first eighteen months. Television exposure,
however, does not equal political success.
During his Presidency, Nixon maintained a ratio of
one press conference for each 4.3 speeches, a communication
imbalance surpassed only by President Kennedy as seen in
Table I.
Nixon's uses of Presidential news conferences
may be categorized in two periods, both fraught with
problems.
First, the period between I969 and 1973 when
televised conferences were reduced in number. Efforts
were made during that interval to use more controlled
and smaller "pseudo" news conferences or "conversations"
to replace the accepted format of the conventional
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial
Presidency
.




PRESIDENT NIXON'S USE OF
TELEVISED PRESS CONFERENCES









SOURCE: For years I969






aThe conferences took place during
September, October and November, 1973.
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meetings with the press. Group and individual
interviews, such as the Dan Rather (CBS), Barbara
Walters (NBC), Howard K. Smith (ABC) and Daniel Schorr
(CBS) "one-on- one" interviews during 1971 , and television
interviews with three to six member media groups in
July, 1970, and January and April, 1971 » were used
perhaps in response to press questions of infrequency
of news conferences and Presidential isolation. As
will be seen frequently in later chapters, Nixon viewed
those "conversations" as acceptable communication
tools he could use in conjunction with presidential news
conferences. During that first period Nixon also made
brief use of "limited" press conferences. In February
and May 1971 and in June 1972 he limited the news
sessions either by subject or the number of reporters
that could attend. Both his "conversations" and
"limited" press conferences were probably efforts to
replace or improve his infrequent news sessions.
Second, during late 1973 and early 197^. the
Presidential response was to resort to "softer," more
^ise, Politics of Lying , pp. 7*H 275 and 339-^0.
*New York Times , July 2, 1970, p. 10; January 5,
1971, PP. 20-21; April 17, 1971, p. l^i May 2, 1971, p. 66.
^Ibid., July 21, 1970, p. 16.
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sympathetic audiences when the Watergate scandal was
reaching crisis-like proportions. The partisan press
conferences of that period may have been a maneuver to
go directly to the people to answer an increasing number
of press questions concerning Watergate and Presidential
isolation and/or to dispel the idea that the presidential
press conference was being avoided. Using a "staged"
press conference before a partisan audience, where the
questions were expected to be soft, caused the meetings
to be more a publicity tool than a source of feedback
for the President during a time when facts were most
needed.^ They were attempts at going directly to the
people over the heads of the media in the guise of press
conferences.
The Presidential responses, first toward panel and
individual interviews, and later toward "staged" news
conferences, were detected—and criticized—by the press
as "nonpress conferences."
At this point a potential historical morass
—
over-reliance on causality—must be pointed out. Nixon's
uses of press conferences, categorized above, are of
course the result of a great number of influences.




e Nonpress Conference," Broadcasting , April 8,

6k
Surely an important one not discussed here, and perhaps
the basis for another study, is his psychological
make-up. Press conferences are, after all, what
individual presidential personalities make them. The
causes listed below, therefore, cannot be all-inclusive.
They are used to paint at least some part of the milieu
found in the background of Richard Nixon's avoidanoe of .
Presidential news conferences.
One cause of Nixon's seldom using press conferences,
applicable to most presidents since Woodrow Y/ilson,
may be attributed to the adversary relationship that
Daniel P. Koynihan has detected between presidents and
the press. Moynihan contends that some of the reasons
for poor press relations are the adversary culture that
has grown from the American muckraking journalism
tradition; the effects of the liberal Washington and
New York presses i media reliance in recent years on leaks
from bureaucracies wanting to get their side of the
story to the press, and a failure on the part of the
7press to correct its own mistakes.
Another cause for the decrease in presidential news
conferences, at least since the Truman administration,
may be found in technological advances in communications
that carry the presidential statement to the nation and
Washington Post , March 1^, 1971, Sect. D, p. 1.
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and the world in seconds. As radio and TV have developed
in an age of "big governments" and nuclear warheads the
complex tasks normally delegated to governmental staff
officers may have become too complicated for impromptu
off-the-cuff explanation by a president in a press
conference. As shown in the last chapter more controlled
forms of presidential communication have generally
increased, perhaps at the expense of press conferences,
as radio and TV developed.
In the case of Nixon, however, one unique cause for
neglecting the press sessions was the poisoned atmosphere
created by Watergate in his second term.
Nixon's basic responses to the Presidential news
conference may have also been caused at least partly by
his earlier experiences with the media.
According to Small in Political Power and the Press ,
President Nixon believed that his difficulties with the
press dated back to his role in the Congressional
investigations of Alger Hiss. According to Small, Nixon
stated that one of the aftermaths of the 19^9 Hiss case
was that for the next dozen years Nixon claimed he was
smeared in a campaign that aimed itself at ". . .bigamy,




Frank Mankiewicz, Perfectly Clear, Nixon from
Whittier to Watergate , (New York, 1973), p. *+7 J Small,
Political Power and the Press, p. 120.
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Nixon's specific distrust of the newspapers may have
begun as early as 1952. It was then that newspapers
broke the story of the "Nixon Fund"—$18,235.00 collected
from wealthy contributors—to pay for his 1950 Senate
campaign expenses against Helen Gahagan Douglas in
California's lA-th Congressional District. At a time
that it appeared that Eisenhower was about to force
Nixon to resign as Republican nominee for Vice-President,
Nixon delivered his famous televised "Checkers" speech.
Nixon wrote later in Six Crises t
My only hope to win rested with millions
of people I would never meet, sitting in groups
of t//o or three. . .in their living rooms,
watching. . .me on television. . . .1 made up
my mind that until after this broadcast, ray
only releases to the press would be for the
purpose of building up the audience. . . .
This time I was determined to tell my story
directly to the people rather than funnel it
. .
.through a press account. 10
Nixon's attitude toward the television crews in the
studio that evening has been compared to his later
attitude during the i960 debates with John F. Kennedy.
Nixon was certainly under great pressure both times and
9Wise, Politics of Lying , p. 326.




in each instance refused any rehearsal time and declined
to tell technicians of his desired movement on the set.
No sooner was Nixon off the air from the "Checkers"
plea than it was apparent his plan had worked. In less
than a week Republican headquarters in Washington
reported delivery of some 300,000 letters and telegrams
running 350 to one in favor of Nixon.
In July 1958, Nixon's "kitchen debate" success
over Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow won the then
Vice-President plaudits that may have encouraged his
12later less-successful debates with Kennedy. Logically,
Nixon may have believed the winning combination of his
use of television in the "Checkers" speech and his
Whittier debating ability in the "kitchen debate" formed
an ingredient that would defeat his i960 Democratic
13
opponent. •* The same logic may have led to his later
Presidential preference for debate-like "one-on-one"
television conversations and interviews with anchor
people during his first term.
In his i960 campaign, however, when Nixon made
^Auld, "Television and Politics," pp. 86-87.
i 2
Henry D. Spalding, The Nixon Nobody Knows ,
(New York, 1972), pp. 39^-95.




the to be regretted decision to debate it was television
that was his undoing. Radio images of the debate
slightly favored Nixon's deep resonant "Mid-America"
voice over Kennedy's high-pitched, Boston-Harvard accent.
On television, though, Kennedy's virility overshadowed
Nixon's less photogenic features and won the Senator
national exposure that proved disastrous to the better
1^known incumbent Vice-President. That defeat was a
setback for the Nixon philosophy of going over the heads
of his imagined newspaper enemies via TV to reach the
American public. The ploy was successfully used in
Nixon's later campaign against George McGovern, however,
in what author Timothy Crouse termed a "non-campaign."
The tactic will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter III.15
After the Hiss case, the "Checkers' speech and the
Kennedy debates another incident reflects the President's
attitudes toward the press t the Nixon press statement of
November 7, 1962, which has come to be dubbed the "You
won't have Nixon to kick around anymore" statement.
1 Auld, "Television and Politics," pp. 88-9^.
^Theodore H. White, The Making of the President
I960
,
(New York, 1961) , pp. 290-95? Timothy Crouse,
The Boys on the Bus
.
(New York, 1973) 1 P. 107.
Small, Political Power and the Press, p. 120.
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According to Jules Vitcover, Nixon's 17-minute fatigue-
and-booze induced outburst, noted for both its self-
pity and courage, ".
. .revealed a capacity for deep
bitterness in Nixon that through his long public
career and long sparring match with the nation's press
he nearly always managed to control, or to cover up."
\7itcover wrote that the "last press conference"
demonstrated a Nixon ambivalence, that appears later in
his Presidential press conferences, when the defeated
candidate for Governor vacillated from vitriol to
condescension, saying on one hand, "I have no complaints
about the press coverage," but on the other that "...
for once, gentlemen, I would appreciate if you would
17
write what I say. . . ." '
Time magazine's 1962 epitaph read, H . . .barring a
miracle, Nixon's public career has ended."
A few weeks after that "last press conference"
ABC broadcast a documentary titled "The Political Obituary
of Richard M. Nixon." Alger Hiss was one of those
interviewed on the program. ABC was flooded with
complaints—eighty thousand letters and telegrams—as
well as thousands of phone calls. Nixon's response was,
'Jules witcover, The Resurrection of Richard
Nixon
,
(New York, 1970), pp. 13-23.
18Ibid. t p. 25.
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"What does an attack by one convicted perjurer mean
when weighed on the scales against the thousands of wires
and letters from patriotic Americans ?•" The ABC
documentary incident provided strong evidence that
Richard M. Nixon was hardly "dead."
In both the "last news conference" and the Howard K.
Smith ABC documentary, it was TV that Nixon may have
seen as his political salvation. At the end of his
seventeen minute dialogue in November 1962, Nixon was
to say:
I think it's time that our great news-
papers have at least the same objectivity, the
same fullness of coverage, that television has.
And I can only say thank God for television and
radio for keeping the newspapers a little more
honest. 19
Interesting in this context is to note the
resemblance between Nixon as Vice-President and Spiro
Agnew as Vice-President. Nixon's use of Agnew in the
Autumn 1969 anti-media campaign—discussed later—has a
strong parallel with Nixon's own role in the Eisenhower
administration. While "Ike" posed as a national leader
and statesman, Nixon implied the Democrats were traitors.
According to one historian, he called Adlai Stevenson
a "Ph.D. from the Acheson College of Cowardly Communist
Containment," termed the Truman administration
19Small, Political Power and the Press , pp. 120-21.
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"the four-headed monster that was Korea, Communism,
corruption and controls," and said that the Eisenhower
administration "has kicked out Communists and fellow
travelers and security risks not by the hundreds but
by the thousands," Though the targets were different,
the assignments of both Vice-Presidents were quite
similar. 20
Finally, the men surrounding Nixon in his 1968
Presidential campaign may have influenced his later
uses of the press and the press conference. Surrogates'
attempts to "protect" Nixon and their insulating influence
21
on him have been noted by several historians. Nixon's
selection of advertising men as key staff members was
not unique. Eisenhower had used them. Five men
experienced in the use of mass communication, advertising
or law were selected for the massive 1968 communication
campaign: H. R. Haldeman, William Safire, Leonard
Garment, Harry Treleaven and Herbert Klein. Their plan
to package and market the Nixon image passed most of
the media unnoticed at the time. James Reston was one
exception, however, when he wrote 1
20Auld, "Television and Politics," pp. 11^-15.
21John Osborne, The Fourth Year of the Nixon Watch
,
(New York, 1973) » P. 122j Arthur Krock, The Consent of
the Governed, (Boston, 1971), p. 136.
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His television performances are master-
pieces of contrived candor. He seems to be
telling everything with an air of reckless
sincerity, but nearly always in a' controlled
situation, with the questioners carefully
chosen, the questions solicited from whole
states or regions, but carefully screened.
He is now complaining publicly about how
he and Mr. Agnew are misrepresented in the
columns of the New York Times , but he has
been refusing to be questioned on the record
by editors of the Times and most other major
newspapers ever since the very beginning of
the campaign.
Mr. Humphrey and Mr. Wallace submitted
to questions by CBS, but Mr. Nixon sent tapes
of replies made in his carefully prepared
broadcasts. And his refusal to debate
Mr. Humphrey on television is merely one more
incident in a long campaign of packaged
broadcasts,
. . .22
Despite Nixon's avowal that his was not going to be
an antiseptic television campaign, that is precisely
what it was. And Nixon won and found he could ignore
press conferences and be politically successful.
The two decades of struggle leading to his Presidency
certainly had some influence, albeit difficult to
measure, on his later use of Presidential press
conferences. Nixon's hatred of the press j his using
television to "go directly to the people" and by-passing
his adversaries; his I960 debate mistake and 1968
controlled-press-environment victory, both at the hands
22Auld, "Television and Politics," p. 10*U
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of television, had established a pattern, a plan of
action with the press, certain to be tested in the
give-and-take of his Presidential news conferences.
Paradoxes between Nixon's early viev/s of television
(".
. .thank God for television and radio for keeping
the newspapers a little more honest,") and later
criticism ("I have never.
. .seen such outrageous. . .
reporting in 2? years of public life.") were explained
by David Wise in 1973 when he wrote:
In discussing Nixon and television.
. .
one must carefully distinguish between
television as a mechanical means of communi-
cation and television as an intellectual
instrument. "Pure" television is okay,
television news is not. As President, Nixon's
use of television flowed logically from these
basic premises^ thus, at every opportunity,
Nixon solemnly addressed the nation, but he
usually avoided the give-and-take of the
televised news conference. Only in the first
setting did Nixon have total control— 23
Early experiences with the media may underlie the
basic responses President Nixon made with regard to
his sparse Presidential meetings with the press. None
of the responses, save the brief attempts at "limited"
press conferences, were substantial in terms of public
relations substance. Most were attempts to subordinate
the media. The President limited an avenue of feedback
23Wise, Politics of Lying , p. 375.

7^
by his reaction, and confused a one-way advertising
approach to communication with the public relations
concept of satisfactory two-way communication.

CHAPTER III




[Wjhen information which properly
belongs to the public is systematically-
withheld by those in power, the people soon
become ignorant of their own affairs,
distrustful of those who manage them, and
—
eventually— incapable of determining their
own destinies.
—President Richard M. Nixon
March 8, 1972
In his first Presidential press conference, held
one week after his inauguration, President Nixon
made no opening statement and answered 14 questions.
He delivered his remarks from the low stage in the
White House East Room, the same place occasionally
used by President Johnson, with only a standing
microphone necessary to record his comments for the
press between him and some 450 members of the press.
He shunned the lectern used by his two immediate
2predecessors.
1Phillips, "Radio and Television," p. 3?.
2New York Times , January 28, 1969. p. ll 12.
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The President noted in response to a question
regarding curbing inflation, that he did not believe
that policy, especially foreign policy, should be made
by "off-the-cuff" responses at press conferences, "or
any other kinds of conferences," saying policy should be
made in an orderly way. The President made no other
comments in reference to press conferences, and the
New York Times described him as "getting off to a good
start" with "nervous determination," in his press
conferences,
,
During a February news conference Nixon again
intimated he was reluctant to use conferences for policy
formation to "indicate publicly" his plans on a dock
strike, noting it would have the effect of "telling
L
the parties to do nothing."
At his third press conference, announcing his trip
to Europe, the President spoke without notes, again
standing alone behind a free-standing microphone in the
East Room. The news conference was televised, as were
his previous ones, and characterized by "an unusually
professional air," according to the New York Times .
3Ibid., p. 13.
Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard Nixon
1969 t (Washington, 197D i P« 73. Hereafter cited as
Public Papers, Tdate") .
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In one response Nixon noted his belief in explaining
unpopular issues to the people to gain their support.*
And, for the second time, the President elaborated on
the press conference and foreign policy. He responded
to a question of possible resumption of bombing in
North Vietnam by saying
i
Well, Mr. Wilson [Richard L. Wilson of
The Register and Tribune Syndicate , Des Moines,
IowaJ that question is one that I have given
thought to, but it is one I think should not
be answered in this forum.
I believe that it is more effective in
international policy to use deeds rather than
words threatening deeds in order to accomplish
objectives,
6
During his fourth press meeting, on March 14, 1969t
the President announced plans for modifying the Sentinel
missile program and once again alluded to the use of
press conferences in making foreign policy. His news
conference was televised, and the President responded
to a question by Merriman Smith concerning repeated
attacks on the Demilitarized Zone in Vietnam. Nixon
noted a warning he had given to North Vietnam in his
last news conference, and said that he would M . . .issue
a warning only once. . ." implying that he viewed
5Ibid., p. 189.
New York Times , March 5i 1969. p. 8.
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press conferences, and the press, as vehicles of
foreign policy communication. As he had in the past
press meetings, the President noted, however, that
certain sensitive foreign policy subjects should not
be discussed in a public forum. Again, the New York
Times lauded Nixon's presence in the news conference,
noting the President's lack of notes or lectern, saying -
that he ". . .demonstrated . . .again today . . .he is
a [good] student." The Times commented further that the
President's opening statement, the longest in any of his
conferences thus far, was nearly identical to the 1,500
word handout given to reporters before the press conference
7began.
'
By April 18, the Nixon Presidential press conference
procedure had been established, so far as techniques
were concerned. The news conference was held late in
the morning, in the East Room of the White House and,
like those of President Eisenhower, lasted about 30
minutes. It was broadcast on radio and TV. Again, the
President spoke without notes or lectern. Moat questions
dealt with a North Korean attack on a U.S. reconnaissance
flight. One question concerning the press, dealing
with the press conference, was asked. A reporter
7Ibid., March 15. 1969, p. 16.
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suggested that the President might go "directly to the
country" on the Anti-Ballistic Missile issue. President
Nixon's answer reflected his apparent regard for the
media in early 1969»
No, I have no plans at this time to go
to the country as you have suggested, though
as a matter of fact, I consider a press
conference as going to the country. I find
that these press conferences are rather well
covered by the country both by television as
they are today and also by the members of the
press.
8
Thus, after five news conferences, the President had
referred to the sessions with the press on five different
occasions as accepted conveyors of policy. Nixon had,
moreover, stressed the importance of deeds—as opposed
to press conference words—for a successful foreign
policy on at least two occasions. He held about one
press conference a month during his first four months
in office.
Two months went by before the next Presidential news
conference. On June 19, 19&9, ^he President answered
questions in the East Room. He made his first clear
reference to a potential adversary relationship v/ith the
press when he commented on an article written by former
Defense Secretary Clark Clifford. The President noted,
"from reading all the newspapers," that he allowed more
8Ibid., April 19, 1969. p. 1^.
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controversy and open dissent than in any administration,
"in recent years.""
Another two-month gap passed before the next press
conference, on September 26. (The intervening summer
months saw the beginning of U.S. troop withdrawals from
Vietnam.) President Nixon mentioned his use of
backgrounders to brief members of the press regarding
Republican party matters, and repeated his philosophy
of making ". . .our actions make the news rather than
the words make the news.
.
," in comments regarding
the press. The first indications that any Presidential
"honeymoon" with the press was over, so far as deference
to the President in the framing of news conference
questions, became apparent in that September news
conference. An unidentified reporter asked when the
President was going to make some ". . . hones t-to-goodness
changes. . . " in bureaucrats that had been "in power"
for long periods of time. Another said in a quote,
".
.
.your draft cut is a fraud because. ..." The
New York Times noted that he addressed each query
crisply and evenly, but that there was a suggestion of
impatience with critics on the campuses and on Capitol
Hill. In an interview with the Times , Roger Ailes,




Nixon's television advisor, noted the President's
mechanical skill with the medium, "I talk to him in
technical language and he knows it ali. He can time
himself perfectly.
. .He's like clockwork. . . .He
doesn't use a teleprompter.
"
(On October 15, Moratorium Day, hundreds of
thousands of war protestors gathered across the nation, -
and in Washington, in a generally orderly protest against
the Vietnam War.) 12
In a rather short untelevised press conference on
October 20 at which only six questions were asked, the
President, following a suggestion by Press Secretary
Ron Ziegler, disclosed plans to brief the press on
specific subjects, then allow follow-up questioning,
A count of follow-up questions in Nixon's first five
1969 press conferences showed that about 40.4 per cent
13
of the questions fell into the follow-up category, J
more than the average of 32.6 per cent found in other
Ill-
studies. He also discussed details of a new press
^New York Times , September 21, 1969. P. 84.
12Wise, Politics of Lying , p. 336.
-*Dunn, "Presidential Press Conference, p. 34.
McGuire, "Democracy's Confrontation, I,"
Journalism Quarterly , Winter , 1967, p. 642.
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room—noting that it would be useful for sound~on-f ilm
recording. President Nixon promised that when the
press room was complete, the new press conference format
of having sessions on a "sub ject-by-sub ject" basis
would go into effect on a "sometimes" basis. He
limited that late-autumn meeting with the press to a
lengthy brief on Judge Clement F. Haynsworth's
nomination to the Supreme Court. (In February 1971, a
news conference was limited in numbers of reporters, and
later, in May 1971 and June 22, 1972, conferences were
limited to domestic questions. No other "limited"
press conferences of the type suggested by the President
were held. No evidence was found in this research to
indicate why the format was abandoned after such little
use.) At one point in that eighth news conference of
his Presidency, Nixon noted his agreement with pro-
Haynsworth editorials in the Washington Post and the
St. Louis Post Dispatch , saying he believed the Washington
article to be ". . .quite a thoughtful editorial [and]
quite candid. . ."in substance. -*
On November 3. Nixon delivered a major address on
Vietnam, designed to counteract another antiwar
demonstration scheduled for November 15« Following the
President's speech, newsmen on all three major TV networks
^New York Times , October 21, 1969 , p. 3*f.
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followed with their customary "instant analysis," a
terra originated later by Vice-President Spiro Agnew
in his November 13 » Des Moines speech; Public response
to the commentary v/as "very negative," according to
Herb Klein, director of the Office of Executive
Communication. Public discontent with the "instant
analysis" and the television medium provided situations -
similar to earlier ones surrounding Nixon's "Checkers"
speech, and "The Political Obituary of Richard M. Nixon."
"Instant analysis" may have been perceived by Nixon as
a threat to his established tactic of going over the
heads of the press, directly to the people.
President Nixon had no press conferences during
November 19&9. Vice-President Agnew made his "Gaggle
of Commentators" speech on November 13 in Des Moines,
Iowa, attacking a press monopoly by "the dirty dozen."
That speech marked the start of the Nixon anti-media
campaign. Though later denied by the President, William J.
Small notes that the Agnew speeches were written—at
least in part—by Presidential Assistant Patrick J.
17Buchanan. '
l6Wise, Politics of Lying , pp. 327-38.
^Bill Greeley, "RTNDA Hears Bill Small Rap Nixon





The last news conference of that year was televised,
and conducted at 9 p.m., December 8, to insure prime-
time coverage. One question was asked relating to how
much the American people ought to know about the war
in Laos. The President related generally the progress
being made in Laos and stated that public interest would
not be served by any further press conference discussions.
Another question dealt with Vice-President Agnew's- two-
attacks on the broadcast media during the past weeks.
The President answered the question by saying, in part:
The Vice-President does not clear his
speeches with me. . . .However, I believe
that the Vice-President rendered a public
service in tailing in a very dignified and
courageous way about a problem that many
Americans are concerned about, and that is
the coverage by news media—and particularly
television news media [sic]—of public
figures.
Now let me be quite precise. He
[Agnew] did not advocate censorship. On
the contrary, he advocated that there should
be free expression. He did not oppose bias.
On the contrary, he recognized—as I do
—
that there should be opinion.
, . .1 don't want a bunch of intellectual
eunuchs either writing the news or talking
about the news. I like excitement in the
news, whether it's on television or whether
it's in the columns.
He did say. . .that television stations
might well follow the practice of newspapers
of separating news from opinion. When
opinion is expressed, label it so, but don't
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mix the opinion in v/ith the reporting of
the news. 18
Despite the Presidential disclaimer concerning
the independence v/ith which Agnew made his anti-press
statements, V/illiam J. Small notes several correspondents
did not believe the President. Small cites columnists
Crosby S. Noyes, Richard Wilson, Clark Mollenhoff and
William F. Buckley. 19
Agnew had been selected as the President's blunt
20instrument in carrying out an attack on the press.
Thus, while President Kennedy was tagged with "news
management" and President Johnson was identified v/ith
a "credibility gap," President Nixon became associated
with "Agnewism" during the autumn of his first year in
the Presidency. It was a press tactic later found to
21have originated with the President himself.
In answer to another question regarding how fair
the news media had been in reporting on the President,
the Vice-President and the Nixon administration in
18New York Times , December 9t 1°69. p. 16.
19Sraall, Political Power and the Press , pp. 13*1-36.
20James M. Perry, Us and Them , (New York, 1973)
»
pp. 11-12.




general, the President replied that he believed the media
had been generally fair. He voiced no complaints about
the extent of coverage received, and concluded in a
"Checkers" vein, he would have no complaints so long
as the media ".
. .allows, as it does tonight, an
opportunity for me to be heard directly by the people
and then the television commentators to follow me."
Near the end of the news conference a reporter asked
the President about his opinion of the philosophy that
the role of the press was to hold an administration to
account for its actions. The President replied, in
part, that he had derived a great deal of benefit from
criticism, and ". . .I've never known when I was short
of it." The same reporter had also asked the President
why only three press conferences had been held during
the past six months. Nixon's reply was that he tried
to have press conferences when he thought there v/as a
public interest, as differing from a press interest, or
his private interest. He also pointed out the use of
other devices, such as conferences in his office and
major television addresses, as means of Presidential
communication, and said*
If I consider that the press and the
public needs [sic] more information than
I'm giving through press conferences I'll
have more. I welcome the opportunity to
have them. I'm not afraid of them, just
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as the press is not afraid of me. 22
At year's end, President Nixon had held nine press
conferences, eight broadcast by electronic media. He
had spoken to the nation on radio or TV on only seven
23
other occasions. '
During his first news conference of 1970, President
Nixon made one allusion to "several recent stories"
concerning U.S. foreign policy with Libya that he
disagreed with. He chided the newspapers for
misrepresenting the "pro-Arab, . .pro-Israel" policy
in the Mid-East saying, "We are pro-peace." Answering
another question, he reiterated his belief in good
performance being its own reward by saying
i
Now I know all the words, I know all
the gimmicks and the phrases that would win
the applause of black audiences and professional
civil rights leaders. I'm not going to use
them. I'm interested in deeds. I'm
interested in closing the performance gap, . .
I would rather be measured by my deeds than
all the fancy speeches I may have made. 2^
22New York Times , December 9» 1969i P» 16.
23New York Times Index , 1969» (New York, 1970),
Volumes 57-58, passim.





In April, the White House press corps was moved
out of the West Lobby into its new, and luxurious, two-
level quarters built over the White House swimming pool.
The deep-pile beige carpets, suede Chesterfield sofas
and Currier and Ives prints, however, were also
accompanied by two Marine guards barring the way to the
West-Wing entrance. The press could no longer see guests
coming and going to meet the President. At about the
same time, Ronald Ziegler moved his twice-daily press
briefings from the press secretary office to the briefing
room in the press center. There was no longer easy
opportunity for a reporter to linger in Ziegler's office
after a briefing to ask additional questions. Both changes
tended to isolate the reporters. -*
Another news conference, the first to be televised
in more than three months, was conducted on May 8, 1970.
Student protests over U.S. entry into Cambodia dominated
headlines, and President Nixon was described in the
New York Times as being visibly nervous. Most of the
conference questions dealt with demonstrations and
Southeast Asia. The President answered a question
regarding repression of the press, saying he believed
that the United States was not "headed for a revolution,"
that demonstrations served as a "safety valve"
i
2
^Wise, Politics of Lying , pp. 3^2-4*K
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I do not see that the critics of my
policies. . .are repressed. I note from
reading the press, from listening to
television, that criticism is very vigorous,
sometimes quite personal. It has every
right to be. I have no complaints about it.
Nixon's claim was at variance with his constant
insistence that he did not watch television or worry
about his image.
Nancy Dickerson (NBC), asking a question, made note
of an Agnew speech given earlier that same day that
attacked opponents of administration policy as "a cadre
of Jeremiahs. . .a gloomy coalition of choleric young
intellectuals and tired, embittered elders." Nixon
replied he would not "tone him down," simply because
the Vice-President had a different point of view. Thus,
27
the President once again endorsed his policy of "Agnewism.
In answer to another question, he expressed regret
that his May first use of "bums" to describe dissenters
had been misinterpreted
i
All the members of this press corps know
that I have for years defended the right of
dissent. I have always opposed the use of
violence.
2$bid. f p. 3^0 j 376.
27Public Papers. 1970 1 p. *+l6.
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In another response, the President noted in regard
to the Cambodia invasion that, "rockets by the thousands
and small arms (italics mine) by the millions," had been
captured in Cambodia. The Alderson Reporting Company,
Inc., official transcript given the press read, "rockets
by the thousand and small arms ammunition (italics mine)
by the millions, ..." The substantial difference is noted
here simply to demonstrate that a president's words were
subject to change by the White House—even in a
presidential press conference.
Finally, Nixon answered a question regarding the
office of the President being isolated:
This is an open Administration. It will
continue to be. I also think that people should
have the right to speak out as they do. . .
[in congress], . .in the media and the
universities.
(On June 25, 1970, however, the New York Times and
the Washington Post were excluded from a press briefing
at San Clemente, California. Both newspapers were
outspoken critics of the war.r
The senior wire service representative had signaled
28Ibid., p. *H8| New York Times , June 11, 1970,
p. 8.
29New York Times, June 25, 1970, p. b.
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the end of that press conference with his customary
"Thank you Mr. President," when President Nixon
displayed the Franklin Delano Roosevelt press conference
tack of courting reporters, or his sense of public
relations with the press, by saying
»
Could I ask the members of the press to
wait one moment? For 26 years a member of
this press corps did just what Frank Cormier
did then—he was known as the man who said,
thank you, Mr. President [sic]. Three weeks
ago he met a tragic death, and as we close
this conference, I would like to suggest
that we all stand for a minute in memory of
Merriraan Smith. Thank you. 30
At bt 55 the following morning, the President and his
valet drove to the Lincoln Memorial, where he talked to
a gathering crowd of about 50 curious students. The
President related the discussion had been useful, "There
31
were no TV cameras, no press."-'
On July 1, the President had a "conversation" with
representatives of the three networks i John Chancellor,
Eric Sevareid and Howard K. Smith. The exchange did
not fall into the earlier definition of a news conference,
and is mentioned here to separate it from the primary
30Ibid., May 9, 1970, p. 8.
•^Ronald Ziegler press briefing, May 9. 1970.
Public Papers. 1970 . pp. 422-26.
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vehicle of this study. Time magazine properly differ-
entiated between a "conversation" and what it termed,
a "mass" press conference.
(Congressional findings by the Senate Watergate
Committee examining Patrick Buchanan's papers revealed
that Larry Higby, assistant to H. R. Haldeman, on
July 16, 1970, memoed Jeb Magruder, deputy director,
Committee for the Reelection of the President, on
possible action to start on a petition "by lots of
people" demanding NBC newsman Chet Huntley's
resignation. Huntley had allegedly made unkind remarks
about Nixon in Life magazine.)
During his press conference of July 20, the President
answered a question dealing with Presidential isolation,
by first denying that he had become isolated from the
press and then by acknowledging that he had given
consideration to an earlier suggestion that his office
33
was becoming secluded. -'•'
Nixon's press conference of July 30, his first
Presidential press meeting outside Washington, took
place in Los Angeles. As usual Nixon gave the first two
•^"Winding up the Cambodian Hard Sell," Time .
July 13. 1970, p. 7.
^New york Time3 , July 21, 1970, p. 16.
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questions of the news conference to the two wire
services, and he answered a question regarding objectivity
and fairness of the nation's press. The question was
in regard to Vice-President Agnew's attacks on the
press. The President dodged the question, saying:
Well, my reaction is that I recall once
having comments about the press in California
when I was here, and that didn't seem to get
me very far. All I can say now is i I just
wish I had as good a press as my wife has,
and I'd be satisfied.
In response to another question, the President
noted the importance of the press (he used the word
"people") of California to participate in a Presidential
news conference. He described it as "bringing the
White House to San Clemente, or to Fargo or to
Louisville," implying the value of two-way communication
away from the more formal atmosphere of the White House.
^
A few days later, on August ^, President Nixon
made his Manson "slip" in remarks made to reporters in
Denver. The President called Charles Kanson ". . .guilty,
3c
directly or indirectly, of eight murders without reason."^
The incident occurred during impromptu remarks to
3Zf
Ibid., July 31i 19?0, p. 10.
35Ibid., August 5, 1970, p. 21.
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newsmen that were filmed for television. Unlike a
regular press conference, no questions were asked during
that press statement and Nixon's error, unchallenged by
media questioning, was dutifully reported.-3
During his next press conference, over four months
later, on December 10, 1970, the President was asked
about the Mans on comment and admitted it was probably
unjustified. Later, Edward P. Morgan referred to that
press conference as ".
. .one of the roughest news
conferences that I have ever seen any president undergo."
Morgan was referring to the Nixon admission of a mistake
in his Mans on statement of August 4-. Morgan defended
the value of the press conference by saying, "You don't
get this sort of thing [[Presidential admission of error]
in a handout." That incident may have never occurred
had questions been allowed in Denver.
Indeed, that should have been a "rough" press
conference. Twenty-eight White House reporters, unhappy
with insufficient follow-up questions at Nixon's
Presidential news conferences, had met a few days before
in the Hotel Washington and decided to insure more
"tough" and more follow-up questions. They informed the
-^ Roland Evans Jr. and Robert Novak, Nixon in the





White House of the meeting, and the President spent
several days preparing for it. Despite that unusual
preparation, only about 25 per cent of the questions at
the meeting were follow-up.
During that news conference, the President was
asked a question regarding the paucity of his press
conferences. He gave a lengthy answer that included
other forms of Presidential communication open to him.
He noted reports, speeches and interviews as examples.
Nixon said that the American people were entitled to
see him directly and not ". . .only through the press."
He expressed concern over dominating television too
much, a problem that had plagued President Johnson, and
the question of giving opponents equal time. (The
President may have made a Freudian slip regarding his
feelings toward the press in that answer. His exact
words were « M . . .one network early this summer decided
that it would be necessary to give oppos i tion [italics
mine] to the President's policy
—
opponents [italics
mine] to the President's policy—equal time. . .") The
President suggested ways of improving press conferences,
such as, "more conferences in the [Oval] office; perhaps
more one-on-one ». . .a television conference in which
^Small, Political Power and the Press , p. 186.




.three of the top columnists.
. .
" participate, but
did not answer the question of infrequency.
°
The next day, Senate Watergate Committee testimony
indicates that Magruder sent a memo to H. R. Halderaan,
the President's chief-of-staf f , with suggestions of what
to do because of unhappiness with the way the press had
questioned the President. Magruder explained in the
memo that,
Ten telegrams have been drafted by
Buchanan. They will be sent to Time and
Newsweek today by 20 names around the country
from our letter-writing system. . . .Letters






, Chicago Daily News , St. Louis
Post Dispatch are being prepared and sent.40
During the 19 weeks between the last two press
conferences of 1970, New York Times Washington
correspondent Max Frankel criticized the infrequency of
conferences by noting that a series of important events
had taken place, including acknowledgement of bombing
in North Vietnam, the Son Tay landing in North Vietnam,
**.
.
.Soviet cheating in the Suez cease-fire Zone. . .
[and] hope of enacting major welfare reform. ..."
Frankel noted that there was a Marxist government in
™New York Times , December 11, 1970, p. 32.
^°Variety , October 17. 1973, p. 2*f.
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Chile, and a threat of another missile crisis in Cuba.
Walter Hickel had been removed from the cabinet, he
wrote. Frankel pointed out the fact that the
December 10 news conference would only be President
Nixon's 18th in two years and compared the scant Nixon
record for press conferences with those of past presidents.
Frankel suggested that the value of the whole proceeding "
41
was questionable.
Early in 1971 , Eric Sevareid (CBS) reviewed
Richard Nixon's problems with news conferences. Sevareid
noted that the conference audiences were roughly the
size of Congress j that Nixon had come into office with
a popular vote of only 42 per cent} that Nixon had a
long-standing dislike and distrust of the press. Sevareid
defined the Nixon offensive of "Agnewism" in 196°- and
1970 as impugning, in advance, the credibility of
reporters and interpreters of Presidential actions.
Sevareid noted the President was trying to improve press
conferences. He cited the series of "conversations"
with network reporters and criticized the, "soft —
diffuse, deliberately time consuming. . .off the point,"
answers. Sevareid suggested allowing each of the four
network reporters 10 minutes direct and exclusive
interview time, with the last 20 minutes of the conversation
^New York Times, December 10, 1970, p. 22.
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a "free for all." Sevareid concluded
i
A bearing of friendliness and candor
toward the press will not endanger hira or
his policies. In the long run it will
reinsure both. 42
The President's first press conference of 1971,
held on February 17, was limited to H-0 reporters to
keep it at "manageable levels." -* Questions dealt
mainly with Southeast Asia, and the follow-up rate
was over 50 per cent.
(Six days later, CBS aired "The Selling of the
Pentagon," a key event in the developing abrasive
x
LLl
relationship between the President and the press.)
The Presidential news conference of March 4, 1971,
which came on the heels of press criticism of the
South Vietnamese entry into Laos, was described by
Presidential aides as being one of the best Nixon press
h<
"performances" up to that time. J The President, however,
answered an early question that demonstrated his growing
insularity and failure to understand the importance of
feedback. He said in part, ". . . I. . .can't tell you .
what the feeling is in this city. I can tell you what
ho
New York Times , January 27, 1971. p. 35.
^Ibid., February 18, 1971, pp. 1^-15.
^Sraall, Political Power and the Press , p. 303.
^New York Times , March 5. 1971 » P. 12.
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ray plans are." President Nixon had missed a vital
benefit of press conferences, one which was noted by
President Wilson at his first news meeting, when he
said j
Please do not tell the country what
Washington is thinking, for that does not
make any difference. Tell Washington what
the country is thinking.
. .
George Reedy amplified President Wilson's comment
when he said the press conference is ".
. .the only
occasion in which a president has an opportunity for
brushing up against reality with some regularity. There
is no group except the press that will confront him on
a face-to-face basis with open skepticism." Reedy
suggested that the feedback made a president uncomfortable,
perhaps, but that it was a good opportunity for him to
escape the dangerous insularity caused by sycophants
who surrounded men of tremendous power.
Near the end of the press conference, a question
was asked concerning U.S. commitment in Indochina. The
President's reply reflected his earlier feelings that
actions speak louder than words in his press conferences!
Small, Political Power and the Press , p. 187.
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I would suggest that you ladies and
gentlemen [of the press],
.
.always pretty
much underestimated what I am capable of
doing in terms of withdrawing forces.
. .
Let me put it in perspective.
. .We have had
a great deal of discussion about Laos at the
last press conference and I can see that this
is still an interest here. . . .
I recall at the time that we went into
Cambodia, and all of you out there looking
on television will remember what I said. [The
President followed with a reiteration of his
past remarks,]
Many members of the press disagreed with
me. They thought that was not an accurate
description of what would happen. They are
entitled to that view. Night after night after
I announced the decision to go into Cambodia,
on television it was indicated that decision
would have the opposite effect, that it would
increase American casualties. . . ,
Now I realize that night after night for
the past three weeks on television there is
[sic] a drumbeat of suggestion—not from all,
but from some of the commentators--and I can
understand why they disagree. From the same
ones who said Cambodia wouldn't work, that
this [Laos] isn't going to work.
Now, here in a press conference, we can
debate as to whether or not my view of it is
right or wrong. I hope for the good of the
country mine is, and if it is right, what
you say now doesn't make any difference. ...^7
The comments illustrate the President's antagonism
toward "some" commentators during early 19?1» and show
his belief that events would overshadow their reporting.
**7New York Times, March 5» 1971. P. 12.
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During a United Press International annual
breakfast meeting on April 20, Eugene V. Risher, White
House correspondent for UPI, spoke to his fellow newsmen.
Risher said that the President and other White House
aides believed the press was H . • .either incapable or
unwilling to accurately reflect his [Nixon's] motives
and personality." Risher noted that this belief had
caused an adversary relationship with many newsmen, who
felt they were being used. In an interview with
Barbara Walters on the NBC Today show the month before,
however, Nixon denied any concern about his image with
the American public. As noted earlier, it was a denial
kg
he made many times as President.
A White House press conference on April 29 dealt
mainly with troop reductions in Vietnam. The President
made a short allusion to television inaccuracy when he
noted that TV might have given viewers the incorrect
impression that Washington was in a state of seige from
anti-war protesters. He chided the press, in answering
another question, when he made reference to Vice-President
Agnew being quoted directly after an off-the-record
^8Ibid., April 20, 1971, p. 39.
J+9




Three days later the President held another news
conference limited to two dozen reporters and domestic
questions in San Clemente, California. About 40 per cent
of the questions were follow-up questions. The President
was asked a question dealing with subpoenaing news
material. His reply was revealing in terms of his
stated views of the press t
I do not believe that. . .network
commentators or newspaper reporters—as
distinguished from editorial writers who. . .
have a right to every bias and should express
such bias--are above criticism. . . ,{j.'/]hen
you go. . .to the question of government
action which requires the revealing of sources,
then I take a very jaundiced view of that kind
of action. . . .
. . .But as far as the subpoenaing of
[reporters] notes are concerned. . .as far as
bringing any pressure on the networks as the
government is concerned, I do not support
that. . . .
. .
.Generally speaking, I also feel that
I do not have to say much about that because
regardless of what I say you're going to say
anything you want about me. And it usually
may not be very good. 51
The President on one hand upheld the right to
privileged communication to reporters, but on the other
5°New York Times , April 30, 1971. P. 18.
51 Ibid., May 2, 1971. P. 66.
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displayed his pessimism regarding fair treatment of facts
by news reporters and of bias shown by commentators.
During a televised news conference on June 1, the
President answered 21 questions regarding China, the
U.S. prisoners of war, and war protesters. At the end
of the conference, a reporter asked the President to
account for two major public opinion polls showing that
about two-thirds of the American people did not believe
they were being told the truth about the Vietnam V.'ar.
The President answered that the fact he would accomplish
his goal of troop withdrawals would end the credibility
gap with the American people. Once again, he equated
credibility with his actions.
(Three months later, Dr. Lev/is Fielding's office
was burglarized by the White House "Plumbers.")^
The President noted during that June press conference
that he did not believe the Presidential press conference
to be a proper forum for commenting on political or
partisan questions. J That press meeting was criticized
by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch . Reporters were
criticized for asking lengthy questions and "grandstanding,'
and the President was criticized for his lengthy answers.-'
5 2National Observer , July 20, 1971*-. p. 1^.
S^New York Times . January 2, 1971 • P. 2^.
^St. Louis Post-Dispatch , June 3i 19?lt P. 20,
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President Nixon announced his planned Moscow visit
to a surprise White House press conference on October 12,
1971 # He began the conference shortly before noon, and
"embargoed" the news information until noon, to allow
simultaneous release in Moscow, The President urged
reporters not to speculate on Supreme Court nominations or
Vietnam troop withdrawals at one point; at another he
commented that press speculation regarding an European
Security Conference had been correct. *•*
(A month later, the Washington Post published details
of an FBI investigation of CBS's Danial Schorr, harassment
apparently the result of Schorr's criticism of an earlier
Nixon speech.'' Indeed, telephones of 1? government
57
officials and newsmen were tapped in 1971. Abrasions
between the President and the press intensified.)
President Nixon was selected by Time magazine as
the "Man of the Year," in 1971 1 and as in his earlier
interview with Barbara Walters, told Time correspondent
Jerrold Schecter, "I care about substance," and that
58
he never worried about what the press said about him.^
-^New York Times , October 13 t 1971 » p. 18.
^Michael C. Emery and Ted C. Smythe, eds , Readings
in Mass Communication , (Dubuque, 1972), p. *KL3.
^Chicago Tribune , June Ik, 197^. p. 16.
^8New York Times , December 27, 1971 1 p. 1^.
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In an article in the New York Times on New Year's
Eve, 1971 t James Reston summarized his views of President
Nixon's tactics with the press
t
. . .[A^]t the end of Mr. Nixon's third year
in office, there is an almost complete breakdown
of trustful communication between the Administra-
tion and the press. But the pattern of action by
the President, especially when he has suffered an
important diplomatic or strategic reverse. . .is
fairly obvious.
If you study his self-revealing book, "Six
Crises," you get at least an inkling of his
psychology. When he loses, he lashes back. . . .
In adversity, he has a weakness for the
dramatic gesture. Are things going badly in
Vietnam? Suddenly he invades Cambodia and
later Laos. , .don't take Richard Nixon for
granted. Unpredictability is sometimes a
virtue.
He covers his failures with action. When
in trouble in one field, divert attention to
another.
.
.change the question and dominate the
news, 59
A survey of political writers taken by James Perry
revealed that only four of 44 respondents questioned
had words for the President that could be considered
flattering or favorable by early 1972,
Between Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve, the
President demonstrated his philosophy of deeds speaking
louder than words » Nixon appealed first for human peace
59Ibid., December 31» 1971» P. 19.
Perry, Us and Them , p. 215,
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and dignity, and then ordered the heaviest bombing of
North Vietnam in more than three years.
Three months were to pass before "" the President's
first press conference of campaign-year 1972. The
President announced his trip to China, during that
untelevised press conference of February 10. The
President was asked why he did not hold more news
conferences—the reporter noting that eight months had
elapsed since the last televised conference. The
President said he would hold press conferences whenever
they were in the public interest. He noted as in the
past, the types of press conferences he held, ranging
from "one on one" to small forum conferences including
impromptu ones. He concluded by saying he noted
commentator "eyebrow-raising" as to why he had been on
television so muchi
Let me say, I think television has
probably had as much of the President as it
wants at this point, and that is why you are
getting this kind of conference. 62
Seven speeches and four presidential press conferences
were televised in 1971.
The President also made a point regarding
6lNew York Times , December 31 » 1971* P. 19.
62Ibid., February 11, 1972, p. 161.




South Vietnam's President Thieu. Nixon, contrary to his
earlier stated beliefs of not conducting foreign policy
by press conference said that he hoped his comments would
reassure Mr. Thieu regarding a point in U.S. foreign
policy. In another question, the President referred to
the press sarcastically noting he only had one speech
in 1968, saying, ".
. .that is what you wrote anyway."
During an impromptu news conference in March, the
President chided the press, mildly, hoping the reporters
would report International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation growth under the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations, because he had not "seen that in many
stories." Nixon said he did not view his Presidential
press conferences as a proper forum for partisan political
matters, ".
. .until after the Republican Convention." •>
On two other instances, the President was complimentary
to the press. Once, for "a very thoughtful series"
dealing with compensatory education, and again for pressing
on political contributions, a matter that was of "very
great interest in the Senate and in the nation."
(Prevailing administration attitudes toward the press
were revealed later in Senate V/atergate Committee hearings




66New York Times , March 25, 1972, p. 12.
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disclosing that on June 6, 1972, Buchanan wrote
John Mitchell suggesting the press be used to point out
'£'-'
tha.1t.some of McGovern's "ambitious children" were busy
stealing Wallace delegates to the coming convention.
He suggested the press be used to accuse the Democratic
Convention of "shafting a legitimate popular winner and
stealing the delegates of a bedridden martyr.") '
Max Frankel, a few months later, wrote that the
Presidential press conference was dying. Frankel wrote
in the New York Times that there was no chance to
question the President in reference to important events
including the India/Pakistan war, Jimmy Hoffa, budget
deficits, and so forth. The columnist made a key point
when he noted the President was not shy of public
appearances, but that he liked to appeal over the heads
of the press directly to the people. Frankel contended
that it was not an event that was lapsing, "but a whole
process of communication."
(On June 17, 1972, the Watergate break in occurred.)
On June 22, 1972, President Nixon saidi ". . .the
White House has had no involvement whatever in this
69
67Variety . October 17. 1973. P. 24.
68New York Times , January 19, 1972, p. 12.
69New York Times Magazine , July 22, 1973» PP. 35-37.
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particular incident." 7 That date marked President Nixon's
first press conference in over three months. The confer-
ence was impromptu, not televised, and reporters were
limited to domestic issues in their questions. About
one-third of the questions were follow-up. The first
question dealt with Watergate, and the President made
his denial of any involvement. Another question
concerned itself with Presidential Adviser John
Ehrlichman's statement that the press was asking "dumb
and flabby questions" at news conferences. The President
responded:
You are not dumb and flabby. No, I noted
that comment and expected a question on it. I
am afraid if I begin to characterize the questions
you will begin to characterize my answers, but
you probably will anyway. In any event, as far
as questions are concerned, I think what
Mr. Ehrlichman was referring to was the tendency
in the big East Room conferences for questions
to come in from all over the place and [sic]
no follow-up, as there can be in a conference
like this.
Sometimes the questions may appear somewhat
less relevant. I have found, for example,
although we do not rule out the big conference
where everybody gets to come, I have found that
these smaller sessions do provide an opportunity
for members of the regular White House press who
study these issues day by day and who know. . .
what is relevant and what is not. . .1 think
that the possibility of dumb and flabby
questions is much less and I don't frankly,
complain about it.
'Perry, Us and Them , p. 21^.
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The other point that I should make is
this: In [sic] looking over the transcripts
of various press conferences, I have not seen
many softballs and I don't want any because
it is only the hardball that you can hit or
strike out on. 71
Typical of the President's spurts in news conference
timing, and probably influenced by the coming national
elections, the next conference came a few days later.
It was the first televised news conference in more than
a year. Frank Cormier (Associated Press) began the
session by stating that he did not want to ask a "dumb
or flabby" question and was followed by more sarcasm
from Dan Rather, (CBS) and a second "dumb and flabby"
question barb by an unidentified reporter. The President
noted in response to a question regarding a coalition
government in Saigon that he did not think it would be
particularly helpful in a news conference to talk about
forthcoming negotiations. Once again, the President was
asked for an explanation of the infrequency of televised
press conferences. The President responded, as he had
in the past, that he used the press conference when he
believed it the best way to communicate with the American
people. He noted a differentiation in that answer,
between using the press conference and using the reporters
71New York Times , January 23, 1972, p. 1*K
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to communicate. Nixon said that during "sensitive
periods" the press conference ". . .was not useful for
the President of the United States to. engage in." He
denied trying to downgrade the press conference, saying
he was more concerned with doing a good job, "Now if I
do a good job, the fact that I get a bad press isn't
going to matter. If I do a bad job, a good press isn't
going to help." The President noted that in the
forthcoming elections he would be judged by the job he
had done, and not the number of press conferences he had
held. Nixon reflected part of his press conference
philosophy, making no mention of feedback, by concluding
j
. . .[l]t is essential for a President
to communicate with the people, to inform the
press, who, of course, do talk to the people,
either on television, radio, as through what
they write, and I will perhaps in the future,
£sic] we can avoid the feeling that the
President is antagonistic to them. I can't
say whether the President thinks the press is
antagonistic to him. But that's another
matter. 72
The President's news conference of July 2? was a
televised 39-minute session. He received several
foreign and domestic questions, chief among them being
the subject of the bombing of North Vietnam. There
73
were no questions dealing with Watergate.
72Ibid., January 30, 1972, pp. 2-3.
73Ibid., July 28, 1972, p. 10.
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President Nixon's "political" press conference was
held on August 29, 1972, at San Clemente. It was the
only news conference during that election year where he
overtly allowed questions dealing with the election to
be asked and answered. Reminiscent of Calvin Coolidge,
the President noted during the meeting that ".
. .when
a President speaks.
. .he makes policy every time he
opens his mouth."' John Osborne noted in The Fourth
Year of the Nixon Watch , that the President had
"mesmerized" the press during an answer dealing with
campaign funds. Osborne noted the case as one example
of how the press failed to follow through on a poorly
answered question by the President. ^ In another answer
the President, commenting on Watergate, lied, saying
Presidential Counsel John Dean had conducted a "complete
investigation" for the White House which enabled the
President to declares "I can state categorically that
no one in the White House staff, no [sic] in this
Administration, presently employed, was involved in this
very bizarre incident." Dean later testified before the
Senate Watergate Committee that there never was a
7ff
Ibid. August 30, 1972, p. 20.
'




"Dean Report" , that he never made the investigation
referred to by the President. 7 In fact, the President
had suggested to Dean that he prepare- a report that
would appear complete, but which would be "very
incomplete," during a telephone conversation with Dean
on March 20, 1973. 77 Watergate "deeds" and Watergate
"words" sounded much like Nixon's press conference
philosophy of foreign policy as expressed in his
January and March 19&9 news conferences. In those
meetings, he noted the value of action rather than words
in international relations.
The final Presidential press conference of 1972
occurred on October 5. During that conference tha
by-then-standard question was asked about Presidential
isolation and infrequency of press conferences. Echoing
past answers to the question, Nixon noted various other
modes of communication, including statements made by
subordinates in his name to the people, that he used in
lieu of the press conference. He said he viewed press
conferences not as a "chore," but a challenge.
76National Observer , July 20, 197^, p. 12 j Hays
Gorey, "Dean's Dilemma," Harpers , October, 197^ » pp. 63-65.
^The White House Transcripts , (New York, 197^)
1
pp. 130-31"! As this research is being completed, other
instances of possible Nixon press conference lies are
being disclosed by Watergate coverup trials. See
Wisconsin State Journal , November 19» 197^» P« 2.
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President Nixon was selective during criticism of the
press by differentiating between reporters and commentators
t
. .
.[0]nMay 1st, that weekend, all [critics]
had reached the conclusion that South Vietnam
was down the tube. Time , Newsweek , The New York
Times, The Washington Post , the three television
network commentators— I am not referring to you,
ladies and gentlemen, who are reporters—all in
varying degrees wrote and spoke of the specter
of defeat and the hopelessness of the South
Vietnamese cause. 78
President Nixon's statement was reminiscent of the
tactic used by Franklin Roosevelt in blaming publishers
and editors for press coverage he did not like.
William V. Shannon, however, in commentary for the
New York Times wrote, the day following the press
conference, that Nixon's complaint with the press was
different from most politicians. Shannon said that
Nixon had little difficulty v/ith the publishers, that it
was (italics mine) the reporters, the "natural skeptics"
that caused the President to face "awkward issues."
Shannon compared the President's tactic with the press
to that of some corporation executives who use a public
relations advisor to shield them from the media. He
noted that Nixon had come as close to abolishing personal
contact with the press as was possible, pointing out
the relatively small number of press conferences held
78New York Times, October 6, 1972, p. V}.
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by the President in comparison to his predecessors.
Shannon wrote that he believed the President regarded
the news conference as a confrontation with his adversaries,
and had little capacity for self-criticism, and
consequently shielded himself from the press.
"
Indeed, Cassie Mackin, subsequently "exiled" to
the West Coast, had reported the Presidential closed
audience campaign on September 28 on the NBC Nightly
80News
. Following complaints voiced by Herbert Klein,
White House communication director, the Mackin reports
were stopped. Mackin was later transferred to
Los Angeles as NBC News correspondent, a position she
held until January 197^ f when she was returned to
81Washington as NBC Congressional correspondent. Perry,
in Us and Them , described how reporters were kept
isolated during the Nixon/Agnew fund raising dinners in
New York and Chicago earlier, during May 1971 noting
that correspondents had to watch the proceedings on
television from anterooms adjacent to where the President
was speaking. Perry made the comparison to the use of
surrogates during October 1972 in Atlanta during the
79Ibid.
80Perry, Us and Them , pp. 238-39.
81
Gordon L. Weil, The Long Shot, George McGovern
Runs for President
,
(New York, 1973). P. 230; Crouse,
The Boys on the 3us
, pp. 265-67 J New York Times ,




Nixon campaign against McGovern. Interestingly, the
great majority (over 90 per cent) of newspapers backed
Op Qo
Nixon. " An Editor & Publisher survey made this clear. '
Lyndon Johnson's one-time press secretary, Bill
Moyers, commenting on the isolation strategy, called it
the "triumph of bureaucracy, not democracy." He warned
that a government isolated "from the nerve ends of
society becomes autocratic or paralyzed." He urged
84the President to return to an open Presidency.
Expressing his views on interplay with the Fourth
Estate during the third year of his Presidency, Nixon
had said
:
I respect the individual members of the
press—some of them, particularly the older
ones, who have some standards of objectivity
and fairness. And the individual competence
of many of the younger ones, I respect that
too, though nowadays they don't care about
fairness, it's the 'in' thing to forget
objectivity and let your prejudices show.
You can see that in my press conferences
all the time. You read the Kennedy press
conferences and see how soft and gentle they
were with him, and then you read mine. I
never get any easy questions—and I don't
want any. 85
82Perry, Us and Them , pp. 230-41.
8
^New York Times , October 6, 1972, p. 28.
Bill Moyers, "Losing the President in the
Presidency," Newsweek , November 6, 1972, p. 23.
8
^small, Political Power and the Press , p. 400.
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By the end of his first term as President, Richard
Nixon's views of the news conference had become clear.
He repeatedly voiced a belief that actions, not words
in a question-and-answer session, would be his final
vindication. More, he expressed the view that his news
conferences were but one of several modes for communica-
ting his policies to the American people. Finally, he
viewed the media as his adversary and made his feelings
clear in several press conferences. Singling out media
enemies, Nixon confined himself to publishers, editors
and commentators, despite the fact that a great majority
of newspapers were to back him in his 1972 bid for the
presidency.
Seen in the last chapter was the fact that Nixon's
overall use of press conferences was less than any modern
American president. He steadily diminished televised
press conferences during his first administration,
although he held about half of them during prime-time
viewing hours. Nixon complemented his first-term press
conferences with "conversations" when media criticism
of his insularity grew. Using his news meetings to
proclaim the right of press criticism of his administration
—and singling out individual members of the press corps
for praise—he clandestinely used subordinates to
manipulate and attack the press. Those assaults were
carried out with fabricated independence from
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Nixon's direction. The tack appeared to be one of
seeking praise for Nixon, a President defending
reportorial rights, battling as an underdog in the
"Tijuana bullpit" of his Presidential news conferences.
His views and subsequent uses of the press meetings
contributed to abrasion with the media. The adversary
relationship between Nixon and the press was extended
to depth criticism of his press relations—largely by
commentators and columnists—by the end of 1972. The
seeds had been planted for a Nixon-media distrust that
would grow with the Watergate scandal.

CHAPTER IV
PRESIDENT NIXON'S PRESS CONFERENCES
i
SECOND TERM
There is nothing covered, that shall not
be revealed; neither hid, that shall not be
known.
Be not deceived; God is not mocked
i
For whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he
also reap.
—Bible
A sequestered Watergate jury watched President
Nixon's Inaugural parade on television on January 20,
1973 • The criminal trial had opened a scant two weeks
before the President began his second terra in office.
A Gallup poll taken the weekend following the Inauguration
and an announcement of a peace settlement in Vietnam
had put the President's popularity at 68 per cent,
matching his previous high point in November 19&9» when
he announced his plan for the "Vietnamization" of the
War. 1
The media as a whole had virtually slept through
Watergate—until the election was over. Ben Bagdikian
^White House Transcripts , pp. 83*f-37.
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surveyed **33 reporters employed by the 16 largest bureaus
in Washington and found Watergate coverage lacking
i
The papers as a group, whether or not they
endorsed Nixon, had a poor record of use and
display of [Watergate] stories—major events in
the most ominous episode of high-level dirty
politics in our history, occurring at a crucial
time of national decision-making.
2
Indeed, only one of the three major TV networks
(CBS) had logged over one hour air time reporting on
Watergate between September lb, 1972, to election day.
The other two networks had devoted only about ^1 minutes
3to the subject.
In fact, the first press conference of President
Nixon's second term contained no Watergate questions.
It was held on January 31 » called with only a half-hour's
notice. The questions largely centered around Henry
Kissinger's forthcoming trip to Hanoi. The President
broke with his past tact of blaming columnists for his
criticism v/hen he responded to a reporter's question
of amnesty for draft evaders:
I know it gags some of you to write that
phrase, £" . . .we. . .have achieved a peace
with honor."] but it is true, and most Americans
realize it is true. . . •
2Perry, Us and Them , p. 236.
-'Emery, Readings in r.'ass Communication , p. 395»
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Many Americans paid a very high price to
serve their country, some with their lives,
some as prisoners of war. , .serving in a
country far away in a war that they realize had
very little support among the so-called better
people, in the media and the intellectual circles
. .
.but which fortunately did have the support
among a majority of the American people, who
some way, despite the fact that they were
hammered night after night, and day after day,
with the fact that this was an immoral war,
that America should not be there, that they
should not serve their country, that morally
what they should do v.-as desert their country.**
Later, in the same meeting, the President answered
a question asked by Clark Mollenhoff, Pulitzer Prize-
winning investigative reporter who had resigned in 1970
as President Nixon's private investigator. Mollenhoff 's
question dealt with the use of executive privilege, and
the President seemed to distinguish between "good" and
"bad" reporters in his answer
i
. . .1 perhaps have not been as precise
as I should have been. And I think yours is
a very legitimate question because you have
been one who has not had a double-standard on
this.
But I would rather. . .not. . .have just
an off-the-top of my head press conference
statement delineate what executive privilege
will be.
6
New York Times , February 1, 1973 . P. 20.
^Joyce Illig, "Mollenhoff t 'Mr. President:',"
Intellectual Digest , April, 197^t P. 6.
6New York Times, February 1, 1973. P. 20.
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Mollenhoff would repeat the question louder, again
in late October, with a less patronizing response. In
that first news conference of 1973. the President changed
his approach from the past Franklin Roosevelt tack of
blaming press executives for "bad news," moving down a
rung on the hierarchical ladder to some of the reporters.
(On April 30, 1973* President Nixon praised "a
vigorous free press" for its role in exposing the
Watergate scandal. On that same day he announced the
resignations of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kleindienst.
He fired his counsel, John W. Dean III.)'
President Nixon's next press conference, again
called on short notice, reflected growing press concern
for Watergate. There were only two Watergate-oriented
questions—in answering one Nixon said he had granted
his counsel, John Dean, executive privilege- -at that
conference, but they were to grow in number. In the
single question eliciting a Presidential view of the
press, Nixon saidi
[Noting press speculation]. . .1 know in
some of the press and particularly the black
press, . .that because I did not get a sub-
stantial number of black votes. . .we don't
owe anything to them.
^Perry, Us and Them , p. 238.
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The comment demonstrated but another instance of
Presidential news conference comment attacking press
inaccuracy. (The President denied this black press
o
speculation as being untrue.)
The number of Watergate questions increased to
seven in his March 15 press conference, the third one
that year called on short notice. The President opened
the meeting with a statement announcing the opening of





.in which the most populous nation
in the world and the United States of America can work
together. . . ." His opening statement notwithstanding,
press questioning turned immediately to Watergate. Nixon
answered a question by referring to the Watergate break
in as, "espionage by one political organization against
another," a change from previous White characterizations
of the crime as men acting independently.
After the March 15 news conference there were no
more until August 22, 1973. The five-month one-week
8New York Times , March 3. 1973 i p. 12.
"
weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents ,
(Washington, D.C., 1973). January-March, 1973, p. 271.
Hereafter cited as Presidential Documents .
10White House Transcripts, p. 840.
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silence, during the sunnier of the Senate Watergate
hearings, was the longest press conference gap in the
history of the scheduled presidential press conference.
President Eisenhower had a space of five months and
four days of silence from August k, 1955, to January 8,
1956, during his period of recovery from a heart attack, 11
President Hoover held no press conferences during the
last four months of his Presidency. 12 The San Clemente
news conference in August also ended a span of nearly
Ik months since the last televised press conference.
*
Former Presidential Press Secretary George E.
Christian criticized the inactivity:
. . .President Nixon had too few press
conferences. By the time he got around to
holding one so many questions had built up
—
along with animosities— that his conference
would be more of a confrontation than a means
of informing the people. Ik
The President opened his August press conference
with a statement announcing the resignation of Secretary
of State Rogers. The President made his remarks for the
Pollard , Presidents and the Press, Truman to
Johnson
, pp. 80-81.
Pollard, Presidents and the Press , p. 768.
15New York Times , August 23, 1973. pp. 28-29.




first time behind a rostrum. The New York Times
described the President as "clearly nervous at times."
(Only two days before the nation had Viewed an emotional
outburst by Nixon when, in full view of CBS television
cameras, he angrily shoved his press secretary,
Ronald Ziegler.) 15
The news conference, save two questions dealing
with Vice-President Agnew* s difficulties and a question
alleging a cover-up on Cambodia operations, was focused
on Watergate. The five-month news conference moratorium
had heightened interest, not silenced the subject. The
meeting lasted for 50 minutes, about 20 minutes longer,
than the usual Nixon news conference. In partial answer
to a reporter's question, the President noted that the
press could ". . .attach anything you want [to his
comments regarding the Ellsberg break in] to it. I hope
you will be just as fair and objective as I try to be
in giving you the answer." The President took a question
asking if Agnew should resign as " . . .one that any good
newsman. . .would ask." In another question regarding
the Vice-President, Nixon noted press speculation on the
subject of his confidence in Agnew. He attacked
information leaks in the Agnew case:
^Aaron Latham, "The Reporter the President
Hates," New York Magazine, January 21, 197^. p. 3^.
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• . .[T]he leak of information with regard
to charges that have been made against the
Vice-President, and leaking them all in the
press, convicting an individual, not only
trying him but convicting him in the head-
lines and on television before he's had a
chance to present his case in court is
completely contrary to the American tradition.
The President, including his one-time ally
—
television—in his criticism, noted that only when a
case got to open court did the press have the right to
give it broad coverage, The President was asked about
his thoughts on resigning, and pursued his criticism
of TVs
• • .[l]t is true that as far as the
capacity to govern is concerned, that to be
under a constant barrage—12 to 15 minutes a
night on each of the three major networks for
four months—tends to raise some questions in
the people's minds with regard to the President. . .
.
Near the end of the meeting, the President
temporarily extended his belief to include most members
of the press as his adversaries. He replied to a
question dealing with exploiters of Watergate
i
I would think that some political figures,
some members of the press perhaps, some members
of the television, perhaps would exploit it.
I don't impute, interestingly enough, motives,
however. . . .
, , .1 know that most of the members of
the press corps were not enthusiastic [about
his mandate] . . .And I understand that about
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either my election in '68 or '72. That's not
unusual. Frankly, if I had always followed
what the press predicted or the polls predicted,
I would have never been elected President.
And so I say I have no improper motives to
them. I think they would prefer that I failed.
On the other hand, I'm not going to fail. I'm
hero to do.
. .the best I csji, and I'm sure the
fair-minded members of this press corps, and
that's most of you, will report when I do well,
and I'm sure you'll report when I do badly, 16
The President announced during that meeting he had
turned from Y/atergate, which was "water under the bridge,"
to the "people's business." He accepted all the blame
for the circumstances that produced the break in. '
Typical of spurts in the Presidential news conference
habit during times of crisis—an earlier rash occurred,
immediately after the burglary in Election Year 1972
—
the next meeting with the press followed rather quickly,
on September 5» That news conference was televised from
the East Room of the White House, where most Nixon press
conferences were held. The President began the meeting
with a lengthy statement chiding Congress for failing .
to act in areas such as national defense, energy, and ,
domestic problems, saying it was time to turn to
l6New York Times , August 23, 1973. PP. 28-29.
V/hite House Transcripts, p. 860.
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initiatives in the "interests of all the people."
Reporters, however, continued to pursue Watergate. Half
of the conference contained Watergate-related questions.
At one point, the President noted that he did not resent
questions dealing with his property and finances, saying
that the field of his property was public knowledge.
The President reaffirmed his belief in the power of his
actions over the reported word when answering a question
regarding rebuilding of confidence in his administration j
It's rather difficult to have the President
of the United States on prime time television. .
for four months to have the President of the
United States by innuendo, by leak, by, frankly,
leers and sneers of commentators-~which is their
perfect right—attacked in every Y/ay without
having some. . .confidence being worn away.
Now how is it restored? Well it's
restored by the President not allowing his own
confidence to be destroyed.
Second, it's restored by doing something.
We have tried to do things. The country hasn't
paid a great deal of attention to it. And I
may say the media hasn't paid a great deal of
attention to it, because ycur attention, quite
understandably, is in the more fascinating
area of Watergate.
But as we move into [foreign and domestic
areas of importance], . .the people will be
concerned about what the President does. And
I think that will restore the confidence.




What the President says will not restore
it. And what you ladies and gentlemen say
will certainly not restore it. 19
The President's inclusion of all reporters as his
press adversaries occurred in his comments at his 37th
press conference, on October 3i 1973 • "the third meeting
with the press in six weeks. During his opening
statement the President announced that Secretary of State
Kissinger was to visit Peking again. About half the
questions were concerned with Watergate and Agnew. In
answer to one question, the President reaffirmed that he
did not desire Vice-President Agnew's resignation. In
answer to the fourth question of the news conference he
said, in part:
. . .1 think full statements [regarding
his San Clemente property] have been made
over and over again on this and I really think
anything I would say in answer to your question
in view of the way you have already presented
it as a statement, would not convince you or
anybody else.
Presidential temper rose a few questions later, when
Mr. Nixon answered a follow-up question from Eugene
Risher (UPI) dealing with the Vice-President t
19New York Times , September 6, 1973 1 PP. 26-27.
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I would say further in that respect that
I would hope that in this rather white-hot
atmosphere—which I understand has developed
since the Vice-President's case came to public
attention—that he will not be tried and
convicted in the press and on television by
leaks and innuendo and the rest.
There is nothing really that is more
harmful to [individual rights] than to be
tried and convicted in the press before he
has an opportunity to present his case. And
I would urge all of you ladies and gentlemen,




Let me finish. Hake your judgement on
the basis of all the evidence, and not simply
on the basis of a [sic] unilateral charge that
is made not [sic] under oath. 20
At the end of the press conference, the President
made a comment regarding the press, calling it the
most independent breed of human species. The strained
relationship and the "white-hot" atmosphere existing
between the President and the press for the past three
news conferences was apparent, however. The press had
a grip on his Vice-President and on Watergate that other
foreign and domestic Presidential actions could not break.
The two combatants met again on October 26 at the
White House. The New York Times noted that the President
displayed fatigue, and that his voice displayed




occasional hurt and anger.




(At 8»2^ p.m. on October 20, the President had
dismissed Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox, accepted
the resignation of Attorney General Elliot Richardson,
and dismissed Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus
in what the press dubbed "The Saturday Night Massacre.") '
(During the night of October 25, the President




The President opened that twice-postponed press
conference with a lengthy statement on the Mid-East alert.
The fourth question of the news conference was by CBS
White House Correspondent Dan Rather, who asked about
the President's thoughts concerning resignation or
impeachment. The President quipped he was glad an
impeachment vote was not taken in the news conference
room. Then the President said in parti
21New York Tines , October 27, 1973 » p. 1^.
22Ibid. f October 23, 1973i p. 1.
23 Ibid., October 21, 1973, p. 1.
oh.





. . .fw]hen I made the. . .most difficult
decision of my first term [the bombing of
North Vietnam],
. .that exactly the same words
were used on the networks— I don't mean by
you, but they were quoted on the networks--
that were used now—tyrant, dictator, he's
lost his senses, he should resign, he should
be impeached.
. . .It was a hard decision and it was
one that many of my friends in the press who
had consistently supported me on the war up
to that time d isa.greed with.
. . .The events of this past week I
know, for example, in your head office in
New York some thought it was simply a
bl own-up exercise, there wasn't a real crisis
[sic].
In partial answer to another Watergate question,
the President shifted his attack target from the "head
office" to the reporters and the electronic media
i
I have noted a lot. [of criticism] on the
networks particularly and sometimes even in
the newspapers. ...
The difference now from what it was. . .
25 years ago is the electronic media. I have
never heard or seen such outrageous, vicious,
distorted reporting in 2? years of public
life. I'm not blaming anybody for that.
Perhaps. . .what we did brought it about, and
therefore the media decided they would have to
take that particular line.
But when the people are pounded night
after night with that kind of frantic,
hysterical reporting, it naturally shakes
their confidence.
. .
.and I can assure you that whatever




these shocks will not affect me and my doing
my job. 25
Requests by the National News Council for specific
documentation of the President's charge of "outrageous,
vicious, distorted" reporting were unanswered until
March 197^. Bruce Herschensohn, deputy special
assistant to the President, said then that specific
criticism of alleged news "distortion" was in the
following categories 1
(1) The failure of CBS to report as a lead the
January 18, Middle East settlement.
(2) CBS's calling a documentary on the Middle
East alert in October "The Mysterious Alert," implying
something strange about the controversial operation.
(3) Use of a hold-frame audiovisual technique of
freezing various administration people by CBS news
during the early days of the Watergate story, a technique
associated with Jack Ruby killing Lee Harvey Oswald.
{k) Use of the term "The Saturday Night Massacre,"
when referring to the October 22 firing of Cox and
resignations of Richardson and Rockelshaus.
(5) Use of the term "Operation Candor" by the
Washington Post .
2
^New York Times , October 27, 1973. P. 1^.

13^
Herschensohn named CBS news as the most biased news
agency because "Walter Cronkite's own philosophy comes
across—he's too one-sided." He described ABC
anchormen Harry Reasoner and Howard K. Smith as "not as
much of a problem" as Cronkite. CBS Vice-President and
Director of News William Small dismissed the criticism
of CBS, saying it was simply because "we're the
26
number one news network."
A national public opinion poll commissioned by
CBS and conducted between November 15-18 by Opinion
Research, Inc. (Princeton, New Jersey), found that 57
per cent of the persons polled did not agree with Nixon's
accusation of "outrageous, vicious, distorted reporting
. . .
." Seventy-six per cent believed newsmen should
ask tough, probing questions at presidential press
27
conferences, '
In that same October news conference Nixon answered
a question on the credibility of campaign funds with the
comment, "Well, it's obviously not credible to you. . . .'
in responding to the reporter, James Deakin of the
Ibid., March 27, 197^, P. 7^1 "Buchanan Suggests
Sponsors Lean on Networks to End Liberal Bias,"
Broadcasting , April 1, 197^ 1 p. 36.
'
"More People Believe Network News than Believe
Nixon," Broadcasting , November 26, 197^» P. 21.
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St. Louis Post-Dispatch . Answering a question by
Jerald ter'riorst, Detroit News , the President noted
Presidential honesty questioned with his friend
Charles G. Rebozo being attacked by the media over a
Howard Hughes million-dollar campaign contribution.
".
, .[D]espite the fact those who printed it and those
who said it knew it was untrue. . .," Nixon said that one
of the networks ran allegations, knowing they were
untrue. The fourteenth questioner noted that the
President had first "lambasted" the television networks
and then said he did not blame anyone. The reporter,
Robert Pierpoint of CBS News, who 10 days earlier had
done a special report on Rebozo, asked what television
had done to arouse the President's anger. President
Nixon answered ".
.
.one can only be angry with those
he respects," Reporters moaned audibly at that answer.
In the next question, Nixon redefined his lack of
respect
i
. . .Let me say too I didn't want to
leave an impression with my good friends
from C.B.S. over here that I don't respect
the reporters. V.'hat I was simply saying
was this « That [sic] when a commentator
takes a bit of news and then with knowledge
of what the facts are distorts it viciously,
I have no respect for that individual.
Clark Mollonhoff shouted for the last question of
the news conference. Hollenhoff, as he had in an
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earlier press conference, asked about executive privilege.
The President's answer was not as gracious as it had been
in January that year. He began his answer by saying
i
Well, I should point out that perhaps
all the other reporters in the room are
aware of the fact we have waived executive
privilege. . . .28
Thus, at the end of his 38th Presidential press
conference, Nixon had made it clear that his anger was
directed at certain reporters and television. The CBS
"head office" and Walter Cronkite, were apparently his most
specific adversaries. During a period of anger the
President had, however, aimed his attacks at what appeared
to be all reporting. He had quickly explained that he
blamed no one, but the connotation of his remarks leads
one to suspect that his true feelings had been vented
during that abrasive news conference. Jules Witcover
believed the bitterness in the President's answers revealed
the deep-seated animosity that went back to Nixon's early
years in public life. As candidate and office holder
Nixon had treated the press, wrote Witcover, as a hostile
and dangerous force to be neutralized or, if possible,
undermined. "Agnewism" was noted as one tactic in under-
29
mining the press. '
28New York Times, October 27, 1973. P. 1^.
29Washington Post , March 25, 197^» p. 20.
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Lou Cannon of the Washington Post agreed, saying
that Nixon's "controlled fury" over the questioning of
his credibility was reminiscent of the President's "last
press conference" in 1962. Cannon pointed to the fact
that Nixon had answered several questions referring to
himself in the third person, a habit of Lyndon Johnson
in his later press conference's. Cannon noted that the
President had compared his Watergate critics to his
foreign adversaries .-'
In a poll conducted before that conference, during
the weekend of October 19-22, a Gallup rating showed for
the first time that more people favored impeaching the
President than believed he was doing a good job in office,
It showed Nixon's popularity had fallen, with only
31
29 per cent approving of the way he was doing his job.
The last press meeting of 1973—held on November 17—
took place at Disney World, Florida, before about 400
members of the Associated Press Managing Editor's Annual
Convention. It was Nixon's longest Presidential news
conference, lasting slightly over 60 minutes. In a brief
opening statement, Nixon quipped about the "tough
questions" he expected from managing editors, implying
-^Milwaukee Journal , October 27, 1973. p. 1.
-
31 Ibid., November 27, 1973, P. !•
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that press conference would be more difficult than those
of the past, when he had faced the White House press
corps. ABC News Correspondent David Schoumacher, however,
reported most of the A.P.M.E. questions were not tough,
and noted the White House press was "muzzled," sequestered
32from the editors and their wives. J The President
re-emphasized his previous news conference point that
the place to convict a person was in the courts and not
in the media when he answered one question. Later, the
President made a slur against publishers, jokingly implying
that they were especially knowledgeable in gimmicks for
income tax deductions. He turned to a question of his
taxes with a polite comment that he had noted editorials
questioning his income-tax payments. Nixon explained his
finances in great detail—down to a 1958 Oldsmobile. He
noted that retractions of an alleged one-million dollar
campaign fund question were not given as broad coverage
on TV as in the newspapers. In response to another
question the President indicated he approved of a shield
law for reporters, but was not specific on details of the
provisions of the law. The President seemed to take a
final jab at television, answering a pre-planned question
on a milk fund, when he ran over the alloted hour time
limit, into a station break. He said, "It's a lousy
3 2Broadcasting , November 26, 1973i P. 22.
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movie anyway tonight." The President's primarily
Republican audience did not appear to throw the hard
balls of the normal press conference—one editor asked
the President his plans for retirement. The meeting had
very similar appearances to his 1952 "Checkers" speech:
".
. .this is just before I v/ent into the service, I was
waiting for my service call. . .1 had worked in a service
station. ..."
By earlier press conference standards, the President's
answers were lengthy—he only answered 18 questions
—
about the same number he had handled in other half-hour
meetings with the press. He used the technique of
"planting a lead" at one point saying, ". . .1 am not a
33
crook. "-^
(Four days later an 18-minute gap on one of the
»3^Presidential tapes was made public.)
Over three months passed before Nixon's first press
meeting of 197^ » held on February 25, and televised from the
East Room of the White House. Despite a lengthy opening
statement dealing with the energy crisis, V/hite House
press regulars turned about half the questions back to
Watergate. The President used a rostrum and was described
-^New York Times , November 18, 1973 » PP. 62-63




by the New York Times as being notably nervous at the
outset of the news conference.
*
In opening a White House press conference on
March 6, 197 2* » the President commended Helen Thomas for
being the first female White House bureau chief for
United Press International. Thomas responded by throwing
the President a hard ball concerning hush money. A newsman
asked if the fact that the President had called a news
conference in such quick succession to his first of the
year—eight days—signalled the start of a new policy.
Nixon avoided the question by answering a second part of
the reporter's query, saying in part that he believed all
political candidates should have a right to defend them-
selves against false charges made during a campaign
whether by their opponents, or by the press. The President
began the answer to a double-barreled question by quipping
he had also quit beating his wife. In the final question
dealing with Presidential sentiments toward the press,
in that meeting, the President said that his three
ex-aides, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Cols on had been
or
convicted in the press, "—over and over again
—
"
(A week later Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Colson were
-^New York Times , February 26, 197^» P. 22.
36Ibid., March 7. 197^. P. 32.
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indicted by a grand jury for conspiring to hinder the
investigation of the burglary at the Watergate in
June 197 2. J37
On March 15 i the President held a television question-
and-answer session in Chicago before the Executive Club
of Chicago, an organization of business and professional
leaders. The March 15 questions and answers fall outside
the definition of a presidential news conference in this
paper. Victor Gold, Agnew's former press secretary, called
the session one of carrying the news conference concept
to a "show biz" extreme by avoiding confrontations with
the press. No reporters asked questions. The session
was notable for soft questions--". . .[W]ould you
encourage young people to get into politics. . .?" and
a partisan atmosphere,"
—
[l]n my district you're thought
of belovedly by thousands of people. ..." One member
of the audience was jeered when he asked about Presidential
resignation. In answer to one question, the President
said he believed Watergate had been over-publicized, and
in answer to another question, replied he did not have
adequate time, during that session to respond to recent
articles in The V/all Street Journal and the Chicago
•^' White House Transcripts
, p. 87^.
38New York Times , March 25, 197*+. p. 17.
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Sun Times concerning the deterioration of foreign policy.
™
(A Harris Poll in March 197^ » showed Nixon's overall
job rating stood at only 26 per cent positive, an all-time
low at that point.)
Continuing a spurt of public appearances, Nixon's
last Presidential news conference, the fourth televised
questicn-and-answer session in three weeks, occurred on -
March 19 at eight p.m.
—
prime time—in Houston, Texas.
The President spoke before the National Association of
Broadcasters and answered questions from six White House
correspondents who joined news directors in a panel seated
on an auditorium stage. The President, answering one
question concerning his increasing accessibility,
responded as he had many times in the past that "...
there were times when news conferences weer [sic] not
called for. . ." but said he hoped to continue to hold
them frequently. In another question concerning his
treatment by the press, the President admitted to an
"adversary relationship" between presidents and the press,
and said the press had the right to criticize a president.
He sugggested a "Golden Rule" approach to the problem
saying, "The President should treat the press just as
39Ibid., March 16, 197^ • p. 12.
Wisconsin State Journal
,




fairly as the press treats him."
An exchange with Dan Rather drew varying responses
from the audience, and later editorialists, when the
President asked Rather if the correspondent were running
for office. Rather's reply, "No Mr. President, are you?"
may have reflected the opinion of other observers that
the 197^ press conferences were "show biz" or advertising
approaches to public opinion, lacking important feedback
from partisan audiences. The conferences had the
appearance of an election campaign. Indeed, New York
Times analyst Les Brown described the Chicago and Houston
appearances as "game shows" where the more difficult or
embarrassing the questions, the more courageous the
President appeared, a fact underscored by the applause for
42
the President's answers in Houston.
Thus, after what has been described as an attempt
at "re-election," the institutionalizing of an away-from-
Washington question and answer session, President Nixon
left the presidential press conference an abused shell
in presidential communications history. Since assuming
the Presidency in I969, Nixon had struggled with—then •
retreated from— the glare and strain of pre-scheduled
New York Times, March 20, 1974, p. 29.
^ 2
Ibid., March 22, 1974, p. 71.
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White House news conferences. The friendly audiences
of the Disney World, Chicago and Houston "nonpress
conferences," composed mainly of conservative businessmen,
were quixotic efforts at best. At worst, they represented
a bungling misreading of public opinion regarding the
President and Watergate.
Anchorman Bob Schieffer, CBS, was to renounce thera
as "shows," disdaining the applause and spectators as
"props." He noted they were part of a tactic to make
Nixon appear to be under seige from the press. *
Columnist Norman Miller noted the meetings as part
of a "calculated campaign" to portray Nixon's impeachment
inquiry as being "partisanly motivated," He wrote that
the apparent objective was to create an "underdog
sympathy toward an embattled President; convey the
impression that Congress is tied up in Watergate and
•out to get' the President} and divert the growing
anxiety and distrust of the people away from the President
and toward Congress."
The President's espoused 19&9 press conference
philosophy of "deeds not words," had not been applied.
The showmanship of his final press conferences could not
-'Bob Schieffer, Comments at University of
Wisconsin, Madison, Seminar of June 26, 197^«
Wall Street Journal, March 28, 197^. p. 1^.
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withstand the reality of Watergate.
(In April 197*, President Nixon was named an
unindicted co-conspirator by the same grand jury that
indicted seven of his aides for obstruction of justice.)
(In July the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that
Nixon was to turn over tapes of Presidential conversations
to the House Judiciary Committee.)
(On August 5» Nixon admitted he had withheld the
contents of three June 1972 tapes that showed he sought
to use the CIA to slow an FBI investigation of Watergate.)
(On August 8, Nixon resigned as President of the
United States.
)
Nixon's Presidency ended abruptly. Shockingly.
The President held no news conferences during his last
five months in office, coming within a few days of
breaking his earlier record for the longest gap in
presidential news conference history.
As Watergate unfolded in the summer hearings of 1973
the President's hatred of the media became apparent in
his press conferences. His attacks were directed at
nearly every reportorial level of the media and at almost
all forms of reportage. Radio, his I960 debate ally, was
the only exception to his view of the media as an adversary
—
he never criticized radio in any of his press conferences.




During that second term he used the press conference
as an attempt to divert media preoccupation from Watergate.
Conference opening statements were used frequently—
a
probable attempt to divert reporters' questions to
foreign policy and other non-Watergate subjects. That
effort was feeble, the press continued the attack.
Nixonian press conferences were moved away from Washington
—
half were away from the White House— in what was perhaps
an attempt to evade the liberal East Coast press. But
San Clemente failed as a shield from the tough questions
he espoused to welcome. That tack failing, Nixon turned
to partisan audiences in what the press clumsily defined
as a "P.R. Campaign", He used his government machinery
to mislead and lie to the press while taking his case
over their heads to the people in "non press conferences."
As the Fourth Estate attacked his obfuscation and
as Watergate became an all-consuming crisis, Nixon stopped
the news conferences altogether.
In the end Nixon's Watergate actions could not
withstand the probing of a Presidential press conference.

CONCLUSION
[Credibility is^ restored by doing
something. We have tried to do things. The
country hasn't paid a great deal of attention
to it. And I may say the media hasn't paid a
great deal of attention to it, because your
attention, quite understandably, is in the more




Editorialists and columnists have a tendency to be
optimistic regarding press conferences early in
presidential administrations. That propensity is under-
standable—most Americans want their president to do well.
Yet the press conference tends to peter out late in
presidential administrations.
President Ford is probably no exception to that rule.
At this writing he has held less than a half-dozen news
conferences, and they have been described as generally
successful. He has, thus far, largely patterned them
after Nixon's format, but has introduced some minor
variations. Ford has moved the conferences to settings
easily identifiable with the White House, an effort to
get away from the staged effect of standing in front of
curtains as had Nixon. The conferences have been
scheduled during early afternoon viewing hours generally
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impinging on "house-wife" time, though one was scheduled
during a World Series play-off game. Seating charts
for reporters remain much the same as during the Nixon
administration with the first three rows reserved for the
White House press corps. The press conferences have
lasted about 30 minutes—a fairly established presidential
norm, and the President relies somewhat on cue cards and
notes, speaking from behind a small podium.
The fact that Nixon's assistant press secretary,
Gerald Warren, coordinated the first press meeting with '
Ford's first press secretary, Jerald ter Horst, partially
explains the similar Presidential formats.
In his second press conference, Ford altered past
presidential custom by allowing newsmen to remain
2
standing as a signal they desired a follow-up question.
The practice is similar to one employed successfully in
West German Parliamentary conferences. With that
technique, about 40 per cent of the questions were follow-
up, somewhat better than the press conference norm of
Carla Karie Rupp, "Ford Sticks to Old Format
for First Press Conference," Editor & Publisher ,
August 31 i 197^1 P. 9.
2
"Ford to Alter Format of News Conferences,"
Editor & Publisher, October 12, 197^. p. 13.
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32 per cent found by McGuire in his study.-' Despite
improvement in the amount of follow-up questions, Editor
& Publisher noted that in a "couple of situations" a
debate began to take place between the President and a
persistent reporter, and that fewer questions were asked.
Assistant Press Secretary Larry Speakes, however, described
h.
the press corps reactions to the new format as "very good."
In a less optimistic appraisal, however, the number
of news meetings has only been about the same as those
averaged by Nixon during his first six months in office
—
one a month. As this manuscript is being completed Ford
is still in his first 100 days and his "honeymoon" with
the press will probably erode if the history of most of
his predecessors is repeated. Hopefully, Ford will not
respond to any future adversary relationship with the
media by boycotting press conferences.
Beyond the Ford administration one is tempted to
speculate about future presidential press conference
innovations. The advent of cable TV—with prototypes
^Delbert McGuire, "Democracy's Confrontation*
The Presidential Press Conference, II," Journalism
Quarterly, Vol. 4-5, No. 1, Spring, 1968, p. 36. Hereafter
cited as McGuire, "Democracy's Confrontation, II."
Luther A. Huston, "President Holds Press
Conference in Rose Garden," Editor & Publisher ,
October 19, 197^, p. 13.
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now working—introduces the capability of a completely
new concept in two-way presidential communication. Cable
TV will perhaps one day offer a greatly improved potential
for public opinion monitoring in the United States. That
potential, however, is beyond the scope of this research.
Here it is most relevant to suggest means of
improving presidential press conferences in terms of
present day realities.
Press conference problems were described earlier
i
they lack regularity, a president is not required to hold
them, he is not forced to answer questions, a president
may be used by grandstanding reporters, and problems of
factual inaccuracies exist. Other complaints were noted;
the meetings are too short, too noisy, filled with too
many reporters, allow few follow-up questions, or simply
allow too many "dumb and flabby" questions. "The strongest
and most persistent argument against live TV conferences,"
said Pierre Salinger of his experience with Kennedy,
"was that a single slip of the lip by an American President
[sic] could push an already jittery world a little closer
to disaster."^ Salinger's successor, George Reedy, added
to the list of problems by pointing out press conference
infrequency and the ease with which presidents can




Presidential "domination" is not hard to understand
when one examines the methods available to a chief
executive coupled with the aura of the office. David Wise
lists among others: a simple "no comment" answer; using
a reporter's question merely as a takeoff point for
something he wishes to say; calling on friendly reporters
with "puffball" questions; challenging the premise of the
reporter's question; asking the reporter a question, or
7
simply bawling the reporter out.
How may they be improved?
Some have feared, and others have hoped, that they
o
would be abolished or at least limited to written questions.
John Osborne has said that too few are worse than none at
all. Osborne believes that hard work at reporting and
careful research of texts of presidential statements, along
with serious private questioning of a president may be an
9
alternative to presidential press conferences.
David Wise warns that because of press conference
difficulties, presidents may resort to the use of more
frequent "backgrounders." Wise, properly, criticizes that
°New York Times . January 6, 1971. p. 37.
7Wise, Politics of Lying
, pp. 468-69.
o
"Dangerous Vacuum?," Time , December 26, 1955* P. 51.




trend. He notes press conferences are extra-legal and
a president is not required to hold them, but that custom
has made the public expect them. He advocates, without
elaboration, returning to more of the "traditional" press
conferences.
Pierre Salinger has suggested that the problem of
presidential misstatement can best be corrected by simple
presidential candor and advocates "one-subject" press
conferences.
A frequent suggestion noted for revitalizing
presidential news conferences has been to resort to
12
written questions. President Truman made that suggestion.
Indeed, the demise of twice-weekly press conferences
began after the Roosevelt administration when FDR dropped
the rule.
Arthur Krock once suggested reporters not resort to
written questions, but allow editing of news conference
transcripts before release to the press. He suggested the
media insist on follow-up questions. Krock did not
explain the place of live TV in his suggestion, however,
Wise, Politics of Lying
, p. 515*
11New York Times , September 2k, 1970, p. 4-7
1
McGuire, "Democracy's Confrontation, II," p. 4o.
1 2





nor explain how follov.'-up questions may be insured. -*
Most of these suggestions, while worthy of consider-
ation either ignore human frailties or amount to "turning
back the clock." They genemlly fail to come to realistic
grips with specific contemporary problems in this writer's
opinion. A notable exception is Pollard's idea of smaller
news conference sessions.
James Pollard, concluding his two volume history of
presidential press relations, suggested the meetings may
be improved by holding smaller sessions, with efficient
reporting, fewer "nit-picking" questions and less
"hamming" by reporters.
President Nixon tried smaller press meetings with
mixed results. The very small ones— "conversations" with
one to six commentators— tended to contain too many soft
questions from a press viewpoint. The 30-^0 newsperson
conference, though more effective, raised the democratically
difficult question of who was to attend, and who was to
make attendance selection. (The usual answer to that
problem, undemocratic but v/orkable, was simply to call the
conference on short notice and invite members of the media
present in the White House West-Terrace Press Center
at the time.)
^Krock, Consent of the Governed , p. 241.





At the outset of this research that approach
—
press
conferences with fewer reporters—seemed the simplest and
most logical. Later, a more promising variation on the
idea was found. It was offered by Edward Morgan and
agreed to by Clark Mollenhoff and Peter Lisagor during the
Rational Debate Seminar mentioned earlier. They called
the proposed meeting a "fragmentary" news conference.
It was to be limited by time and subject but not numbers
of reporters. -*
Noted earlier was the fact that Nixon experimented
with the plan on three different occasions in his first
term, limiting subjects to domestic issues but imposing
no time constraints. The meetings were generally success-
ful with a follow-up rate ranging as high as 50 per cent.
Why Nixon failed to pursue his "fragmentary" news
conferences remains a mystery unanswered in this research.
Certainly they offered some promise during an uneasy
period in news conference history. Expert commentary, if
any, on the failure to use them frequently has not been
found. Correspondence to former White House Press
Secretary Ron Ziegler has gone unanswered. The crux of
the news conference dilemma—instant reporting of a
president's words to the world by live TV—may have been
solved by the depth preparation and follow-up questions




encouraged by such a limited forum.
One reason for failing to pursue the format, though
inconsistent with Nixon's philosophy of orchestrated
media performances, has been suggested by George Reedy.
He believes the format too restrictive, noting that in
practice "it would be little more than a presidential
appearance to make announcements."
Unfortunately, this begs the issue. Nixon's
"fragmentary" conferences did not fall into the morass
predicted by Reedy. In fact when held, they were generally
successful.
Past Presidential Press Secretaries Bill Moyers and
Pierre Salinger have recommended the limited conferences,
with their own variations. Moyers would televise them
from a president's office with 12 or 15 White House
regulars in attendance. Salinger believes in the
plausability of one-subject press conferences, having
tried more than one with Kennedy which he described as
17
successful. '
In this writer's opinion the "fragmentary" format,
incorporated with television network pooling, should be
tested further by holding one such press conference
George Reedy, Letter to Author, September 19t
197*.





Another forum developed still later in research was
one offered by George Reedy during a 197^ seminar at the
University of Wisconsin, Madison campus
i
I'd have one fully televised press conference
each month and let that run an hour. Then, I
would have three a month, one each week, in v/hich
the President would call in whatever reporters
happened to be out in the lobby, for questions.
You see here's the dilemma you run intot
the best press conference, from the standpoint
of information, is the one where the President
just calls people in. There you do get an
opportunity for follow-up questions. I covered
a few of the Roosevelt press conferences in the
closing days of the administration. They were
wonderful. There were never more than six or
seven of us standing around his desk. And, of
course, Roosevelt loved it, there'd be a lot of
fencing back and forth. He'd answer a question,
you could follow-up with another question, and
by the time it was over, we really had some
solid information you could write a story on.
Now the trouble with that is that' in the
modern world you aren't going to get that if
you announce the [conference]. Today, every
newspaperman in Washington, if he could get
into a Presidential conference, would be there.
On television, of course, you have to
announce it. That means you have a minimum of
200, and I remember one press conference where
I clocked in ^05 newsmen. I counted, in the
half-hour time slot, . . .about twenty questions.
Once or twice we got twenty-three and once or
twice eighteen, but twenty was about the
average. . . .
The result is at the end [reporters]
run out with twenty first paragraphs and

nothing to put under the first paragraphs.
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Reedy offers a televised return to a mixed
Roosevelt - Kennedy - format press conference. His
proposal, in this writer's opinion, has three distinct
advantages that were demonstrated in Roosevelt's press
meetings.
First, as Reedy pointed out, it allows depth
coverage of news.
Second, Reedy 's proposal would greatly increase
consistency in news flow. The press conferences would be
on a fairly routine and frequent basis.
Third, the proposal goes to the heart of the unique
two-way feature of presidential news conferences. It
promotes the element of presidential feedback, not in
subject areas of a president's choosing, a problem with
Morgan's "fragmentary" press conference proposal.
Another press secretary of Johnson's, George E.
Christian, agrees with Reedy's plan but would modify the
monthly hour-long conferences:
If a president has frequent informal news
conferences, as I believe he should, 30 minutes
is ample time for a televised news conference.
1 8
George Reedy, Comments at University of Wisconsin,
Madison, Seminar of June 21, 19?^.
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It allows 15 to 20 questions which are usually
sufficient to cover the important subjects.19
Reedy' s plan has its drawbacks, depending on one's
outlook, however.
First, it tends to favor the White House press corps.
One may say the favoritism is a benefit: that the group
represents a competent and specialized branch of reporting.
That is essentially the argument favoring all beat
reporting. Beat reporters, however, sometimes tend to
over-specialize and lose objectivity. They inevitably
become wrapped into the establishment of their source.
The second drawback in Reedy's plan is that it
reduces presidential flexibility with public communication
during times of crisis. On one hand, the televised hour-
long meeting each month could be employed (and often is)
as an effective foreign policy tool, accentuating the
potential value of an American presidential press confer-
ence as a means of rapid communication with world-wide
publics. Such usage is not new? it started during the
Eisenhower administration. The contrary side of the
flexibility problem, however, might be new. A scheduled
monthly televised press conference would be difficult to




"unschedule" during periods of national or international
political sensitivity if silence were a presidential
objective. A chief executive's advantage in timing would
be hindered. Reedy, in his plan, however does not call
for a particular time of the month for the televised
conference, so one can reduce the problem of limiting
flexibility to a matter of degree. A president would have
a month-long block to use in his press conference-timing
selection.
In a third drawback, Reedy ignores the fact that
television, as a news source, has a legitimate right
to cover any news event open to other information media.
Neither the Reedy nor the Morgan solution is perfect.
Using both formats and selecting the plan most advantageous
under particular circumstances still leaves an imperfect
press conference format. Unfortunately the structure of
the meetings—in any format using live radio and TV
—
poses the potential danger of a Nixon-like October 26,
1973 i press conference tantrum during a period of inter-
national or domestic sensitivity.
Delbert McGuire did not recommend a particular forum
for news conferences in his 1967-68 study. Rather, he
pointed out desirable aspects of any news conference
regardless of format.
McGuire, guided by his poll of White House press corps
members, suggested that timing of press conferences was
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not in itself a problem. Presidents, he reasoned, have
little inclination to favor either a morning or evening
press in terms of deadlines. McGuire' s study concluded,
however, that regularity in scheduling was important.
McGuire, perhaps idealistically, also suggested
internal cooperation by the press while preparing for
news conferences, he suggested preparation emphasized in
basic journalism reporting courses. His preparation and
cooperation amount to establishing a priority for questions
asked at news conferences. That was tried during the
Nixon administration with cries of "conspiracy" from some
newspapers as well as the YJhite House.
He also suggested, as has Reedy, that television
participation be limited to only certain meetings to
avoid problems inherent with that particular medium.
McGuire suggested a follow-up question system such as
that recently adopted by President Ford with apparently
successful results.
He also suggested voluntary attendance limitation by
the press, noting several reporters from the same newspaper
in some conferences. Network pooling fits into his
suggestion.
Finally, McGuire recommended against the common
administration practice of planting questions with
reporters. He properly pointed to use of press secretary
briefings and presidential statements for that purpose.
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Realistically, a planted question, like a leak, serves
both the purposes of the Y/hite House and the reporter and
will probably continue.
An easily implemented decorum improvement was
suggested editorially by Editor & Publisher for eliminating
the "jumping- jack" performance and shouting of "Mr.
President" by reporters. The magazine recommended simply.
that reporters remain seated and raise their hands for
20presidential attention.
Naturally, the possibilities noted above are not all-
inclusive. They are offered in some detail because they
represent to this writer the most plausible approaches.
Others, such as eliminating presidential news conferences
altogether, making thera mandatory or delegating the
responsibility to a vice-president, fly in the face of
logic and presidential prerogatives.
A plan such as substituting the conferences with
backgrounders—suggested by Clark Mollenhoff—would be
functional on an occasional basis, but not at the expense
21
of replacing news conferences. Written questions, other
than taking a backward step, risk accusations of "news
management," on one hand, and speculation or rumor about
20
"Press Conference Change," Editor & Publisher ,
October 19, 197^ » p. 6.
21Morgan, e_t al
.





passed-over questions on the other. YJhen Walter Lippmann
suggested the idea after Eisenhower's heart attack in
1955 » Press Secretary James Hagerty's response was
negative saying, "You might as well get speeches out of
the guy." 22
One may suggest, logically, that though imperfect
as they stand, presidential press conferences should not
be tampered with: allow the meetings to evolve, as they
have, along with electronic media, press secretarial and
presidential influences. Dwindling press meetings since
19^5 suggest otherwise. Certainly presidential press
conference numbers alone are not an accurate means of
evaluating their value. Frequency and format, however,
are methods of determining public opinion feedback
available to a nation's chief decision maker.
That contention brings this conclusion full cycle 1
President Nixon neglected that key avenue of feedback.
New conferences, while not a communication panacea,
are partial indicators of presidential exposure to public
beliefs and expectations, via the press. This is
particularly true in a paradoxical period of individual
isolation in an environment of mass communication and big
government. They protect chief executives from the
isolation that was partially responsible for Nixon's




Nixon failed to differentiate between one and two-
way communication. This research has attempted to place
his press conferences in that presidential perspective.
The development of electronic media, from the Truman
to Johnson administrations, had abetted the trend toward
one-way communication by presidents. Press conferences
were downgraded as presidents, for any number of reasons,
lost control of their spoken and printed words and were
moved ever closer to instant public scrutiny as press
conferences developed electronically. There is irony in
the fact that while electronic media became more sophisti-
cated, face-to-face two-way presidential communication
seemed to lapse. That trend was demonstrated in Table I
by showing a significant decrease in presidential press
conferences as speeches and statements increased after 19^5»
Presidential avoidance of press meetings after the midpoint
in their second term compounded the problem of infrequent
conferences. Beyond those problems, certain presidents
shunned news conferences more than usual as public opinion
turned against them late in their administrations.
A complex and demanding public information milieu
developed at the same time Richard Nixon began his political
ascendancy to the Presidency. In this writer's opinion
Nixon lacked many qualities seen in successful—or
unsuccessful
—
politicians in a vocation frought with

16*
dangers of public confrontation.
The Hiss case brought Nixon's first major clash with
the press but his later "Checkers" speech and "last press
conference" showed him a way of by-passing his media
enemies. His disasterous Kennedy debates and successful
1968 "advertising" campaign showed him the power of a
carefully orchestrated communication environment, especially
one utilizing television.
His view of the media as a carrier of neatly
packaged Madison Avenue advertising—one-way from him to
the people—was in danger from the start of his Presidency.
Another capability of the media, that of evaluation and
criticism, began to make itself felt in the first year of
Nixon's Presidency.
The press had generally backed Nixon in his 1968
m
campaign for President, and his first six months in office
were basically ones of harmony with the media. By the
end of his first term his "anti-media" campaign had ended
the tranquility. He expressed annoyance with editors,
publishers and commentators in his news-conference
statements. He began a trend of reducing televised news
conferences. He followed that with an approach of
substituting "conversations" for traditional meetings with
the media in press conferences. When he held them, the
President used press attacks on him to foster a public
image of an underdog. He piously proclaimed his belief
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in the Fourth Estate right of free expression, even at
his expense, and favored some reporters with recognition
while using governmental surrogates to manipulate,
harrass and attack the press. His espoused public
philosophy of little concern for press conference "words"
did not match his clandestine "deeds."
In the last chapter the "deeds" Nixon asked to be
judged by became his betrayer. His anti-media offensive
was turned to a second-term defensive as the crimes of
Watergate emerged. To escape public demand for facts,
Nixon turned to partisan-type press conferences before
carefully selected friendly audiences. His press
conference comments depicted a deepening hostility toward
the press that extended from press executives down to
reporter level. Nixon tried moving the press conferences
away from their White House environment. He tried
diverting their content to other important news areas with
his opening statements.





PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT OP
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
The following comments were made by President
Roosevelt at his first press conference on March 8, 1933*
They represent such a significant presidential press
conference policy change that they are included here in
detail. About 200 reporters were present.
1
. . .My hope is that these conferences are going to
be merely enlarged editions of the kind of very delightful
family conferences I have been holding in Albany for the
last four years.
I am told that what I am about to do will become
impossible, but I am going to try it. We are not going
to have any more written questions; and, of course, while
I cannot answer seventy-five or a hundred questions
because I simply haven't got the time, I see no reason
why I should not talk to you ladies and gentlemen off the
record in just the way I have been doing in Albany and in
the way I used to do in the Navy Department down here. . . ,
There will be a great many questions, of course, that I
won't answer, either because they are "if" questions—and
I never answer them. . . .
And the others, of course, are the questions which




not ready to discuss, or I do not know anything about.
There will be a great many questions you will ask that
I do not know enough about to answer.
Then, in regard to news announcements, Steve [Early]
and I thought that it would be best that straight news
for use from this office should always be without direct
quotations. In other words, I do not want to be directly
quoted, unless direct quotations are given out by Steve
in writing. That makes that perfectly clear.
Then there are two other matters we will talk about
»
The first is "background information," which means material
which can be used by all of you on your own authority and
responsibility, not to be attributed to the White House,
because I do not want to have to revive the Ananias Club.
Then the second thing is the "off the record"
information which means, of course, confidential information
which is given only to those who attend the conference. . . •
I want to ask you not to repeat this "off the record"
confidential information either to your own associates who
are not here. . . .That is to say it is not to be used and
not to be told to those fellows who happen not to come
around to the conference. . . •




PRESIDENT NIXON i NEWS CONFERENCES
1. January 27, 1969
2. February 6, I969
3. March 4, 1969
4. March 14, 1969
5. April 18, 1969
6. June 19, 1969
7. September 26, 1969
8. October 20, 1969
9. December 8, 1969
10. January 30, 1970
11. March 21, 1970
12. May 8, 1970
13. July 20, 1970
14. July 30, 1970
15. December 10, 1970
16. February 17, 1971
17. March 4, 1971




20. June 1, 1971
21. August 4, 1971
22. September 16, 1971
23. October 12, 1971
24. November 12, 1971
25. February 10, 1972
26. March 24, 1972
27. June 22, 1972
28. June 29, 1972
29. July 27, 1972
30. August 29, 1972
31. October 5. 1972
32. January 31. 1973
33. March 2, 1973
34. March 15, 1973
35. August 22, 1973
36. September 5, 1973
37. October 3, 1973
38. October 26, 1973
39. November 17, 1973
40. February 25, 1974
41. March 6, 1974
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